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TYSON FOODS AND THE FUTURE OF
STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION*
ROBERT G. BONE**
Statistical adjudication, the practice of using sampling and other
statistical techniques to adjudicate large case aggregations, is
highly controversial today. In all its forms, statistical
adjudication decides cases on the basis of statistical extrapolation
rather than case-specific facts. For example, a court adjudicating
a large class action might try a random sample of cases, average
the trial verdicts, and give the average to all the other cases in the
aggregation. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme
Court rejected a sampling proposal as inconsistent with the Rules
Enabling Act, calling it “Trial by Formula.” In the wake of this
decision, at least one commentator declared the death of
statistical adjudication.
In an important decision last term, Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, the Court changed course and breathed new life
into statistical adjudication. It upheld the use of sampling to
establish liability and damages in a Fair Labor Standards Act
case and indicated that sampling might be available in other
cases as well. The Court’s opinion is far from clear, however, and
offers little guidance to lower court judges trying to determine
when and how to use the procedure in future cases.
This Article explores the impact of Tyson Foods on the future of
statistical adjudication. Part I defines statistical adjudication and
distinguishes it from statistical evidence. Part II shows that Tyson
Foods is better understood as a case of statistical adjudication
than simply a case of statistical evidence. Part III takes a closer
look at the Court’s opinion in an effort to tease out factors and
principles to guide the future use of statistical adjudication. Part
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IV explores reasons for the vague discomfort with the procedure,
reasons that seem tied to nagging doubts about its legitimacy.
Critics worry that statistical adjudication is too strange a fit with
adjudication, too substantive to be legitimately implemented as
procedure, and too mechanical to count as a proper form of
adjudicative reasoning. Part IV argues that statistical
adjudication is not as strange as it might seem, that its outcome
effects do not make it too substantive, and that while it substitutes
a mechanical decision algorithm for the usual reasoning process,
it does so in a way that can be justified as legitimate. It is time
that we recognize statistical adjudication for what it is: a useful
procedural tool that, when carefully designed and selectively
deployed, is capable of adjudicating large case aggregations
fairly and efficiently.
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INTRODUCTION
Statistical adjudication, the practice of using sampling and other
statistical techniques to adjudicate large case aggregations, is highly
controversial. In all its various forms, statistical adjudication produces
decisions based not on the facts of the specific case but on statistical
extrapolations from results in a sample of other cases.1 For example, a
court adjudicating a large class action might try a random sample of
cases, average the sample verdicts, and either give the average to all
the other cases in the aggregation or calculate an aggregate damages
award for the class based on the average. When properly designed,
statistical adjudication can produce a reasonably accurate aggregate
liability figure, reduce the total private and public costs of litigation,
and sometimes save enough in litigation costs to make plaintiffs
better off than they would be with individual trials. Notwithstanding
these benefits, courts have always had serious misgivings about the
procedure. Only a few federal district courts have used it, and many
of those courts have been reversed on appeal.2 In its 2011 decision in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3 the Supreme Court dismissed a
proposed sampling procedure with the pejorative label “Trial by
Formula” and held that it exceeded the limits of the Rules Enabling
Act (“REA”).4 In the wake of this decision, at least one commentator
declared the death of statistical adjudication.5

1. For examples of statistical adjudication, see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d
767, 782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D.
Tex. 1990), vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
2. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d
198, 250–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part, 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom.
Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (D. Haw.
1995), aff’d sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Cimino, 751
F. Supp. at 653; Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trial by Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1461
n.10 (2015) (reviewing cases in which sampling procedures have been rejected as well as
cases that show unease about the use of sampling).
3. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
4. See id. at 367.
5. Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 1459 (noting that after Wal-Mart “[t]he notion that a
court could try a representative sample of monetary claims and extrapolate the average
result to the remainder of the cases was finished”). For other discussions of statistical
adjudication published after Wal-Mart, see Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A
Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in Class Action Litigation, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY
& RISK 67, 82–83 (2015); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX.
L. REV. 571, 577–79 (2012). See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling
Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Sampling
Damages] (arguing that the use of random sampling for damages can facilitate mass tort
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This death notice was premature. In an important decision last
term, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,6 the Supreme Court changed
course and breathed new life into statistical adjudication. But the
Court’s opinion is far from clear. It treats the case as one involving
statistical evidence and employee-specific inferences when it actually
involves substituting statistical averages for employee-specific fact
finding. This makes it more like a case of statistical adjudication than
a case of statistical evidence. Moreover, while the Court contemplates
the use of statistical adjudication more broadly, its opinion offers little
explicit guidance to lower court judges who must determine when and
how to use the procedure in future cases.
Thus, while statistical adjudication is alive, its prognosis is
uncertain. But why? Why the discomfort with using statistical
techniques to extrapolate from sample results to outcomes in related
cases? The concern seems to be about more than just the overall
balance of social costs and benefits or the impact on participation and
substantive rights. When objections are framed in legal terms, they
often invoke institutional limits on what courts can properly do. But
what are those limits? And why does a seemingly sensible procedure
for fairly and efficiently resolving large aggregations of related cases
exceed those limits?
This Article explores the impact of Tyson Foods on the future of
statistical adjudication. It builds on my earlier work analyzing the
costs and benefits of statistical adjudication and extends that work by
developing its implications in light of the Tyson Foods decision.7 The
Article has two main goals. First, it seeks to fill the gap that the Tyson
Foods Court left open and develop a sensible set of principles and
factors to guide future use of statistical adjudication. Second, it
probes the reasons for general discomfort with the procedure. Unless
that discomfort is diagnosed and critically examined, statistical
adjudication is unlikely to fare well, even in those cases where it
otherwise makes sense on policy grounds.
The body of this Article is divided into four parts. Part I defines
statistical adjudication and distinguishes it from statistical evidence.
litigation); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Essay, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV.
329 (1999) (arguing that sampling for liability makes sense in a range of cases).
6. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
7. For this earlier work, see Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial
Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 231–33 (2011) [hereinafter Bone, Actuarial Litigation];
Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 566–69 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical Adjudication].
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Part II provides background on Tyson Foods and examines the
Court’s opinion with care. It shows that Tyson Foods is better
understood as a case of statistical adjudication than a case involving
only statistical evidence. It also highlights an important aspect of the
decision: the Court extends statistical adjudication beyond estimating
damages to determining liability as well.
Part III argues that Tyson Foods, when properly understood,
authorizes statistical adjudication well beyond the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim at issue in the case. Part III also
develops a set of principles and factors to guide future use of the
procedure. It does so by carefully examining what the Court says and
does in light of the broader purposes of civil adjudication and the
impact of sampling on outcome quality and participation rights.
Part IV explores reasons for the vague discomfort with statistical
adjudication. This discomfort, I believe, is tied to nagging doubts
about the legitimacy of the procedure. Critics worry that statistical
adjudication is too strange a fit with adjudication, too substantive to
be properly implemented as procedure, and too mechanical to count
as a legitimate form of adjudicative reasoning. Part IV addresses each
of these concerns in turn. It argues that statistical adjudication is not
as strange as it might seem, that its outcome effects do not make it too
substantive, and that while it substitutes a mechanical decision
algorithm for the usual process of judicial reasoning, it does so in a
way that can be justified as legitimate.
I. STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION DEFINED
There are many uses for statistics in civil adjudication.8 The
substantive law sometimes explicitly incorporates a probabilistic
element that invites statistical proof, such as the “likelihood of
confusion” test for liability in trademark law.9 Sometimes the law
includes an element that is best evaluated statistically. For example,
in a Title VII disparate impact claim, the differential effects of the
defendant’s employment practices must be measured in statistical

8. For some examples, see Joseph B. Kadane, Probability Sampling in Litigation, 18
CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 299–303 (2011).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). Liability for trademark infringement
depends on whether the defendant’s use of a mark is likely to cause consumer confusion,
and sampling consumer reaction is a common way to prove the requisite likelihood. See 4
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 23:1, 23:2.50 (4th ed. 2016).

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

612

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

terms.10 And sometimes the law points to counterfactual propositions
that can only be proved by statistical methods. For example, statistical
modeling is used in antitrust suits to determine damages when it is
impossible to know directly what the counterfactual market free from
the antitrust violation would have looked like.11
In all these examples, the substantive issue itself is statistical or
makes sense only in statistical terms. As a result, statistical evidence is
the obvious—and often the only—way to prove the issue and
generate a reasonably correct substantive result for each individual
case. In a trademark suit, for example, likelihood of consumer
confusion is statistical by definition, and statistical sampling of
prospective consumers is the best way to determine it. Moreover,
disparate impact in a Title VII suit is essentially a statistical concept
calling for statistical proof. And in an antitrust suit, when the
substantive law requires proof of a counterfactual scenario for which
there can be no direct evidence, statistical modeling is an obvious way
to proceed.
Statistical adjudication is different. It employs aggregate statistics
to decide issues that are not intrinsically statistical and for which, in
theory, there could be nonstatistical, case-specific evidence. Thus,
statistical adjudication does not focus on the individual case or try to
generate a correct substantive result for each case based on casespecific facts. Instead, it treats each case as an average case and
substitutes the sample average (or other statistic) for a case-specific
result based on individualized fact-finding.12 For example, when a
judge adjudicates a large aggregation of cases by taking a random
sample and averaging the sample case verdicts, the judge does not use
the sample average as evidence from which to infer specific causation,
contributory fault, damages, and the like for each individual case.
That would be using the sample average as statistical evidence.
Rather, the judge applies the sample average in place of individual
facts and generates an average outcome for each plaintiff or an
aggregate award for the class as a whole.

10. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 79–89 (3d ed. 2010).
11. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 116 & n.11
(1969) (allowing the computation of antitrust damages based on a counterfactual
calculation that plaintiffs would have enjoyed 16% market share as opposed to their actual
3.2% share).
12. For more background on statistical adjudication, see generally Bone, Statistical
Adjudication, supra note 7.
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There are other ways to implement statistical adjudication. One
can, for example, use the sample average as a presumption that shifts
the burden to the defendant when the defendant has no evidence to
offer in rebuttal. Indeed, in Tyson Foods, as we shall see, the Court
assumed that the defendant could not rebut the presumption and,
therefore, that the sample average controlled the outcome for all class
members just as though the presumption had been conclusive.13
A particularly important feature distinguishing statistical
adjudication from statistical evidence has to do with the reason why
the sample average is allowed to affect or control outcomes. For
statistical evidence, that reason is to achieve the best possible jury or
judge determination of the relevant issue based on the facts of an
individual case. Since the aim is to get as close to the right decision as
possible, the focus is on the probative value of the sample average
compared to other available evidence.
The focus of statistical adjudication is different. The primary
reason to use the sample average in statistical adjudication is not to
get the right result on the facts of each individual case. Instead, it is to
get a good enough result for all cases so that the substantive law
achieves its deterrence goals and litigants are treated fairly and justly
in relation to one another. As we shall see, the use of the sample
average in Tyson Foods overcomes proof problems caused by the
defendant’s failure to keep adequate records and does so in a way
that supports collective adjudication of the small claims involved and
enables private enforcement of the FLSA.14
The distinction between statistical adjudication and statistical
evidence is not always perfectly clear or precise. For example, an
evidentiary presumption designed to force disclosure of information
aids in enforcing the substantive law. Thus, one might use a sample
average to support a presumption that shifts the burden to the
defendant to force the defendant to disclose private information. This
would be use as statistical evidence if the defendant is likely to have
the information and its disclosure would improve decisional accuracy
on the facts of the individual case. In Tyson Foods, however, the focus
is not on ferreting out private information or getting as close as
possible to an accurate estimate of overtime in each individual case.
Instead, the focus is on generating a rough average estimate of

13. See infra notes 58–60, 87–88 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section III.A.1.
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overtime for all employees in order to overcome impediments to suit
and optimally serve the policies of the substantive law.15
Stated simply, it is one thing to use the sample average because
the best interpretation of the substantive law authorizes its use and it
has probative value, or even because it supports a presumption that is
designed to ferret out case-specific evidence relevant to deciding an
individual issue when there is a reasonable expectation that the
defendant has evidence to offer (so most cases will be decided in the
ordinary way). It is quite a different thing to use the sample average,
when the substantive law requires an individualized determination, on
the ground that there are case-specific procedural or evidentiary
problems with generating an individualized decision and enabling
enforcement of the substantive law. The former is use as statistical
evidence; the latter is use for statistical adjudication.
No matter what form it takes, statistical adjudication involves
sampling. There are different ways to sample cases from an
aggregation. One might draw a single sample or one might divide the
aggregation into subgroups and sample each subgroup separately.16
The latter approach, known as stratified sampling, is more costly, but
it is also useful in coping with greater population heterogeneity.17
The simplest way to employ statistical adjudication is to try a
random sample of cases and average the sample results.18 To
illustrate, suppose there are 100 aggregated cases. Rather than try
each case individually, the judge randomly samples ten cases and tries
each sampled case to a jury. Suppose that the jury finds for the
defendant in two of the ten cases, and with respect to the other eight,
it returns a verdict of $100,000 in two of those eight cases, $500,000 in
four, and $1 million in two. The average of the sample results is

15. See infra Section II.B.
16. For example, the trial judge in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp.
649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998), used a stratified sample,
dividing the asbestos class into five disease categories and sampling from each separately.
See id. at 653.
17. It is also possible, in theory at least, to construct a linear regression equation from
the sample results and use it to generate outcomes that vary with different case
characteristics. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 584–87. Properly done,
linear regression can produce results that are even more closely tailored to the particular
facts of individual cases, but it is even more costly to implement than stratified sampling.
18. The trial judge in the Cimino case proceeded in this way although he let the
plaintiffs in the sampled cases keep their actual verdicts and gave the average to all the
other plaintiffs in the aggregation. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

2017]

STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION

615

[(2 × 0) + (2 × 100,000) + (4 × 500,000) + (2 × 1,000,000)] ÷ 10 = $420,000.19
The court then enters a judgment for an aggregate award of
100 × 420,000 = $42,000,000—or gives each plaintiff an average award
of $420,000.20
In a variant on this approach, instead of trying each case in the
sample, the judge appoints a special master to survey and depose the
sampled plaintiffs.21 Based on the results of these surveys and
depositions, the special master recommends average damages for the
population as a whole or average damages for each subgroup of a
stratified sample.22 The judge submits these averages to a jury, along
with expert testimony about the statistical reliability of the sampling
procedure and perhaps some testimony from the sampled plaintiffs.23
The jury decides whether to accept, modify, or reject the sample
average and then returns an aggregate verdict.24
It is important to bear in mind that even when a jury alters the
sample results, it does not do so in order to determine the facts of
each individual case. The reason the jury hears evidence beyond the
sampling study is to evaluate the reliability of the methodology and
possibly make adjustments to account for overall characteristics of the
aggregation. The jury cannot find individual case-specific facts
because it has no evidence for individual cases beyond those in the
sample, and as we shall see, it cannot draw reliable case-specific
inferences unless the aggregation is unusually homogeneous.25
In these examples, statistical adjudication is used to determine
both liability and damages. However, it is also possible to prove
liability in the usual case-specific way and use sampling only to
19. There is another way to do this that yields the same result. First, note that two
verdicts for the defendant implies a 20% invalidity rate for the entire population of cases.
So, one might first apply the 20% invalidity rate to yield eighty cases in which plaintiffs
should receive verdicts. Focusing on just the eight sample cases with plaintiff verdicts, the
average is [(2 × 100,000) + (4 × 500,000) + (2 × 1,000,000)] ÷ 8 = $525,000. As a result, each
plaintiff receives 525,000 – (0.2 × 525,000) = $420,000. This is the method the special master
in Hilao appears to have used. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–84 (9th
Cir. 1996).
20. Or it might give the sampled cases their own individual awards and the rest of the
cases the sample average.
21. The method described in this paragraph is roughly the method used in Hilao, 103
F.3d at 782–84, and also the method proposed by the Ninth Circuit for determining
backpay awards in Dukes, see Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 627 (9th Cir.
2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
22. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 783.
23. See id. at 784.
24. See id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 158–60.

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

616

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

measure damages.26 In addition, statistical adjudication can be used to
decide only particular issues. As we shall see, the court in Tyson
Foods used statistical adjudication to determine a key factual issue
critical to both liability and damages—the time taken to don and doff
specialized equipment—and it did so by admitting into evidence a
sampling study and allowing the jury to modify the sample average.27
Finally, judges dealing with large aggregations sometimes select a
sample of cases for so-called “bellwether trials.”28 The purpose of
holding bellwether trials is to facilitate settlement by generating a
common baseline of trial verdicts to help estimate a settlement value
for the aggregation.29 Although the bellwether trial procedure
involves sampling, it is distinct from statistical adjudication. The goal
of bellwether trials is to facilitate settlement; the goal of statistical
adjudication is to render a final judgment binding on all cases in the
aggregation.
A point of clarification is in order before proceeding. This
Article frequently refers to “sampling” without also mentioning
statistical adjudication. Virtually all of these references assume
sampling is being used as part of a statistical adjudication procedure.
Where this is not the case, it will be clear from the context.
II. TYSON FOODS: A CRITICAL SUMMARY
A. The Background Facts
Tyson Foods was a wages-and-hours case brought by employees
of Tyson Foods, Inc.’s pork processing plant in Storm Lake, Iowa.30
The lawsuit, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, alleged claims under the FLSA and the Iowa Wage
Payment Collection Law (“IWPCL”) to recover damages for

26. See Walker & Monahan, Sampling Damages, supra note 5, at 549, 561–65.
27. See infra Section II.A.
28. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608 (E.D. La. 2008); Eldon
E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict
Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2326–29 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (2008) (analyzing the merits of bellwether trials).
29. Lahav, supra note 28, at 577–78.
30. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042 (2016). For an
interesting discussion of the parties’ litigation strategy choices and their impact, see
generally Andrew J. Trask, Litigation Matters: The Curious Case of Tyson Foods v.
Bouaphakeo, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 279.
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uncompensated overtime pay.31 The plaintiffs sought to represent
other similarly situated employees under a FLSA collective action for
the FLSA claims and under a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the
IWPCL claims.32
The dispute arose out of Tyson’s method of compensating
employees in the kill, cut, and retrim departments at the plant.33 The
work involves slaughtering and preparing meat for market, which
requires the use of knives and other sharp implements, and as a
result, employees wear protective gear to safeguard against injury.34
The issue in the case had to do with Tyson’s responsibility to pay for
the time employees spent donning and doffing their protective gear.35
Tyson’s so-called “gang-time” system compensates employees
for the time they actually spend at their workstations but not for time
spent donning and doffing.36 In 1998, Tyson began compensating for
donning and doffing time, but rather than keep track of the minutes
for each employee, the company used an average figure of four
minutes per day, which it called “K-code” time.37 K-code time was
changed in 2007 so that only some employees received it, and those
who did were credited with between four and eight minutes,
depending on their equipment.38 Thus, throughout the period covered
by the lawsuit, Tyson paid all employees for gang-time and some
employees for gang-time plus K-code time.
The plaintiffs alleged that for many Storm Lake employees the
time spent donning and doffing protective equipment exceeded the
K-code time and that, as a result, their actual compensable working
31. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1042. The Court makes clear that the IWPCL claim
targets the same allegedly wrongful conduct as the FLSA claim. Id. (“This statute provides
for recovery under state law when an employer fails to pay its employees ‘all wages due,’
which includes FLSA-mandated overtime” (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 91A.3 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.))).
32. See id. The FLSA collective action is created by the FLSA statute, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 216 (2012), whereas the Rule 23(b)(3) class action is created by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The FLSA collective action is an opt-in
procedure; employees must affirmatively elect to join the action in order to benefit from it
and be bound by it. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2013).
The Rule 23(b)(3) class action, by contrast, is an opt-out procedure; class members must
affirmatively choose to exit the class if they wish not to be bound by the result. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).
33. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1042.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 1041.
36. Id. at 1042.
37. Id.
38. Id.

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

618

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

time exceeded forty hours per week, entitling them to overtime pay.39
Because Tyson kept no records of donning and doffing times, the
plaintiffs had no basis for calculating individual overtime.40 They
relied instead on two studies: a statistical study by Dr. Kenneth
Mericle that estimated average donning and doffing time for a sample
of employees and a study by Dr. Liesl Fox that used the results of the
Mericle study to calculate the overtime pay owed by Tyson.41
The Mericle study employed a statistical sampling procedure to
estimate average donning and doffing times. The Court describes the
study as follows:
[The] evidence included employee testimony, video recordings
of donning and doffing at the plant, and, most important, a
study performed by an industrial relations expert, Dr. Kenneth
Mericle. Mericle conducted 744 videotaped observations and
analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities took.
He then averaged the time taken in the observations to produce
an estimate of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim
departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.42
Mericle’s averages were then used in the Fox study and
combined with Tyson’s records of gang-time and K-code time to
determine which employees worked overtime and how much
uncompensated overtime they were due.43 Fox estimated the total
amount of uncompensated overtime at $6.7 million for all employees
in the aggregate.44 He did this by adding Mericle’s average donning
and doffing time to Tyson’s record of gang-time for each employee,
subtracting any K-code time, and then summing up the results over all
the employees.45 The Supreme Court gave two helpful examples to
illustrate the methodology:
For example, if an employee in the kill department had worked
39.125 hours of gang-time in a 6-day workweek and had been
paid an hour of K-code time, the estimated number of

39. See id.
40. Id. at 1043.
41. See id. at 1043–44. Other FLSA cases decided before Tyson Foods relied on
similar studies. See, e.g., Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 362 (4th Cir. 2011)
(describing expert time studies used to measure the average donning and doffing time in a
poultry processing plant).
42. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043.
43. Id. at 1043–44.
44. Id. at 1044.
45. Id. at 1043–44.
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compensable hours the employee worked would be: 39.125
(individual number of gang-time hours worked) + 2.125 (the
average donning and doffing hours for a 6-day week, based on
Mericle’s estimated average of 21.25 minutes a day) – 1 (K-code
hours) = 40.25. That would mean the employee was being
undercompensated by a quarter of an hour of overtime a week,
in violation of the FLSA. On the other hand, if the employee’s
records showed only 38 hours of gang-time and an hour of Kcode time, the calculation would be: 38 + 2.125 – 1 = 39.125.
Having worked less than 40 hours, that employee would not be
entitled to overtime pay and would not have proved an FLSA
violation.46
The key thing to note about these estimates is that they are all
based on average donning and doffing times and not on actual times
for each employee. If all employees took identical time to don and
doff, average time would be the same as actual time. But the evidence
made clear that employees took different times, and those
differences, though small, significantly affected Tyson’s liability to
individual employees.47 If an employee did not work overtime—and a
few minutes per day compiled over a week of work determined that
fact—Tyson was not liable to that employee.48 These points may seem
obvious, but it is important to keep them clearly in mind as we
unpack the Court’s opinion.
The district court certified a collective action for the FLSA
claims and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for the IWPCL claims.49 The
case went to trial. In addition to submitting the Mericle and Fox
studies, the plaintiffs also introduced evidence to prove Tyson’s plantwide compensation policies and practices, called a number of
employees as witnesses to testify to the nature of the equipment and
their own donning and doffing times, and submitted video recordings
of donning and doffing activity.50 The jury found Tyson liable and
46. Id. at 1044.
47. See id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting); infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
48. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043 (“Since the employees’ claims relate only to
overtime, each employee had to show he or she worked more than 40 hours a week,
inclusive of time spent donning and doffing, in order to recover.”).
49. Id. A total of 444 employees opted into the FLSA collective action, and a total of
3,344 employees remained in the IWPCL class at the close of the opt-out period. Tyson
Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043.
50. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-04009, 2012 WL 4471119, at *3
(N.D. Iowa Sept. 26, 2012) (noting that some employees “testified to the[ir] general
practices . . . regarding the donning and doffing of [personal protective equipment
(“PPE”)]” including “which PPE items were used by different groups of
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returned a verdict in the aggregate amount of roughly $2.9 million.51
Tyson moved to set aside the verdict, arguing, in part, that neither the
FLSA collective action nor the Rule 23 class action was properly
certified.52 The district court denied Tyson’s motion, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.53 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed by a six-to-two margin.
B.

The Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) whether there was
sufficient commonality among the claims to support certification of a
class action and a collective action, and (2) whether it was permissible
to distribute an aggregate damages award to the class when some
class members suffered no legal injury.54
As to the first issue, Tyson argued that donning and doffing times
varied too much across departments and across employees in the
same department to satisfy the FLSA’s “similarly situated”
requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.55
Furthermore, to establish liability, each employee had to prove that
he or she worked overtime and was not properly compensated for it.56
Tyson insisted that these were individual questions that varied from
employee to employee—some employees worked overtime and
others did not, and those who worked overtime did so for different
periods of time.57
employees . . . how often people donned and doffed these items, how these items were
stored, cleaned, and sanitized, and how long it generally took for people to don and doff
the items[,]” and “[w]itnesses also testified that Plaintiffs spent more time donning and
doffing their PPE than Defendant paid them in K-code time”), aff’d, 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
2014), aff’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
51. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1044. Tyson requested a single trial of liability and
damages and an aggregate verdict, rather than a bifurcated proceeding and individual
damage verdicts for each employee. Id. However, Tyson’s choice makes no difference to
the statistical adjudication issue. Mericle’s average figures would still have to be used
whether damages were individualized or aggregated.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1041.
55. Id. at 1046. Section 216 of the FLSA requires that all employees in a collective
action be “similarly situated[,]” 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012), and Rule 23(b)(3) requires that
common questions “predominate” over individual questions, FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
56. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046 (“To be entitled to recovery . . . each employee
must prove that the amount of time spent donning and doffing, when added to his or her
regular hours, amounted to more than 40 hours in a given week. Petitioner argues that
these necessarily person-specific inquiries into individual work time predominate over the
common questions raised by respondents’ claims, making class certification improper.”).
57. Id. at 1041.
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The Court, however, held that a jury could rely on Mericle’s
sample averages to determine how many employees worked overtime
and how much overtime they worked.58 More precisely, the Court
held that the sample average supported a rebuttable presumption of
each employee’s actual time.59 Since Tyson did not keep records, it
had no evidence to rebut the presumption on an individualized basis,
so its “primary defense was to show that Mericle’s study was
unrepresentative or inaccurate.”60 For this reason, what had been
individual questions about employee work time became common
questions about the adequacy of the Mericle study. As a result, both
the predominance and similarly situated requirements were satisfied,
and the Court affirmed certification of both the class action and the
collective action.61
The second issue arose because the class included employees
who never worked overtime and thus had no legal claims. Tyson
argued that it was improper to distribute shares of the aggregate
damage award to those uninjured employees and that since it was
impossible to identify uninjured employees in order to separate them
out, the suit could not proceed as a class action.62 The Court rejected
this argument as premature.63 It held that the district judge should
first be given a chance to see if a distribution method could be devised
that excludes the uninjured employees.64

58. See id. at 1047.
59. See id. (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 685, 687–88
(1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84, 86–87
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012))).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 1045–49. In fact, the Court assumed that a FLSA collective action would
be permissible if a Rule 23 class action were permissible and therefore focused exclusively
on Rule 23 requirements. See id. at 1045. There were other common questions in the case,
such as whether donning and doffing activities were compensable work under the FLSA
and whether the time was excluded under the FLSA’s de minimis exception, but the Court
did not rely on these questions alone to satisfy predominance. See id. at 1043, 1045–49.
62. Brief of Petitioner at 51–52, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036
(2016) (No. 14-1146). Tyson had originally argued that a class action was proper only if the
plaintiffs could prove that the class included only members who actually suffered legal
injury. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (No. 14-1146)). But it abandoned that
argument in favor of a narrower one questioning the distribution of the aggregate award.
See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 49).
63. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1050.
64. Id. The Court mentioned a possible approach, which, like its liability analysis,
assumed that the jury actually found that all employees took an identical time to don and
doff:
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The Court’s Reasoning

One of the most striking aspects of the opinion is how
challenging the Court found it to justify the sample average. This is
especially surprising because the case seems a particularly strong one
for statistical adjudication. Tyson employees were unable to prove
their individual overtime with direct evidence because Tyson kept no
records of actual donning and doffing times.65 Moreover, most, if not
all, employees had too little at stake to justify the cost of an individual
suit, so a class or collective action was necessary to vindicate the
substantive rights at stake.66 And the requirements for certifying a
class or collective action could be satisfied only with a collective
method of determining liability and damages, which statistical
sampling supplied.67 As for Tyson, its substantive liability would be
about the same with sampling as without. As long as the sampling
procedure was properly designed—and Tyson raised no objections to
its design68—aggregate damages based on the sample average would
closely approximate total damages based on individual trials.69
The following discussion critically reviews the Court’s reasoning.
In what is perhaps the most important step of its argument, the Court
characterizes the case as one involving statistical evidence and a jury
inference from sampling results, rather than statistical adjudication
[B]y working backwards from the damages award, and assuming each employee
donned and doffed for an identical amount of time (an assumption that follows
from the jury’s finding that the employees suffered equivalent harm under the
policy), it may be possible to calculate the average donning and doffing time the
jury necessarily must have found, and then apply this figure to each employee’s
known gang-time hours to determine which employees worked more than 40
hours.
Id.
65. Id. at 1042. And, of course, neither did the employees.
66. Apparently, employees incurred “overtime damages ranging from a few cents to
several thousand dollars,” and 509 workers suffered injuries ranging from twenty-seven
cents to less than $100. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 804 (8th Cir.
2014), aff’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). This level of recovery is generally
inadequate to support individual litigation. See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705
F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting in a FLSA case that losses of “several thousand
dollars” are not “enough to finance a modern federal lawsuit”).
67. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
68. Id. at 1044.
69. This result follows from the statistical property that the sample average is close to
the population average for a large enough sample. For a discussion of this and other
statistical properties of the sample average, see RICHARD J. LARSEN & MORRIS L. MARX,
AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS § 3.9, at
162–73 (2d ed. 1986).
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and the application of the sample average directly. Having
characterized the case in this way, the Court then justifies the use of
the inference to determine liability as well as damages. Finally, the
Court removes the Wal-Mart barrier to sampling by reinterpreting
Wal-Mart’s “Trial by Formula” holding.70
1. Evidentiary Inference or Statistical Adjudication?
The Court treats the sample averages generated by Mericle’s
study as so-called “representative evidence” from which a jury could
infer the factual findings necessary to decide each employee’s
separate case.71 In Tyson Foods, each employee’s FLSA right was an
individual right, and Tyson’s liability was owed to each employee
individually, not to all employees as a group. In keeping with this
individualized focus, the Court framed the “central dispute in the
case” as whether the jury could properly infer that “each employee
donned and doffed for the same average time observed in Mericle’s
sample.”72
This is an odd way to frame the issue. It was not possible on the
facts for a reasonable jury to infer that each employee took the same
time to don and doff. Such an inference defies common sense given
the obvious differences among employees, and the evidence in the
case indicates otherwise.73 Even employees who actually testified at
trial described different donning and doffing times.74 At one point,
70. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
71. See id. at 1046. The phrase “representative evidence” and its close cousin
“representative testimony” are standard in FLSA litigation used to refer to the practice of
relying on evidence from some employees to support findings for all employees. See, e.g.,
Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 66–68 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“representative testimony” in a FLSA action brought by the secretary of labor); Indergit
v. Rite Aid Corp., 52 F. Supp. 3d 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“representative testimony” in
a private FLSA action); LaFleur v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 463, 473–75
(E.D. Va. 2014) (referring to evidence from a sample of employees as “representative
testimony” and noting that “[t]estimony of a representative sampling of plaintiffs in a
collective action is a procedure often used in FLSA actions”); Falcon v. Starbucks Corp.,
580 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that plaintiffs can use “representative
testimony” in a FLSA case).
72. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046. The Court assumes throughout the opinion that
the jury found identical times. See id. at 1050.
73. Id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “cut and retrim employees took
between 0.583 minutes and over 10 minutes to don preshift equipment” and “[n]o two
employees performed the same activity in the same amount of time”).
74. Id. at 1057 (“For instance, Mericle’s study estimated that kill department
employees took an average 6.4 minutes to don equipment at their lockers before their
shift—but employee Donald Brown testified that this activity took him around 2 minutes.
Others also testified to donning and doffing times that diverged markedly from Mericle’s
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the Court hedges a bit by referring to “roughly equal time[s].”75 But
roughly equal is not the same as identical.
This is important because it means that the only thing the jury
could have done is use the sample average itself as the time for each
and every individual employee.76 This strongly suggests that the case
is more like one involving statistical adjudication than one involving
statistical evidence. If the sample average functioned only as
statistical evidence, the jury would have had no reason to rely on it
for cases where there was individual evidence, as there was for some
of the sampled employees in the Mericle study.77 Moreover, as
explained further below, if the goal had been to use the available
evidence to get as accurate a decision as practically feasible in each
individual case, it would have made sense for the Court to require
each employee to submit her own average time based on a Mericletype study of her personal donning and doffing activity.78 Although
these individualized averages might differ somewhat from the actual
historical times, they should be more accurate for individual cases
than a population-wide sample average. However, if the Court had
required individualized averages, donning and doffing time would
have been an individual issue, threatening Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance and class action treatment.79
I am not suggesting that a jury could never rely on a sample
average to infer facts about individual employees. Had Tyson’s
liability turned on what was an objectively “reasonable” time to don
and doff, then the sample average might have been justified as
statistical evidence probative of an objectively “reasonable” time. But
the Court treats the sample average as probative of actual time, not
estimates.”); see also Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-04009-JAJ, 2011 WL
3421541, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 4, 2011).
75. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (majority opinion).
76. Or the jury could have used a modified version of the sample average. In fact, the
jury awarded less than half the total damages that Fox calculated using the sample
average. Id. at 1044. This means that the jury must have modified the result in some way
or discounted some of the claims (or just felt that the actual damages were too high).
Unfortunately, there is no way to determine exactly what the jury did. See id. at 1052
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (speculating on what the jury might have done).
77. See id. at 1055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the wide variation in the times
taken by the sampled employees observed by Mericle).
78. See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
79. In effect, the Court assumes that the jury decided in two steps: that it first inferred
actual time for an employee (call her X) from Mericle’s averages and then determined
liability and damages for X based on X’s actual time. However, the jury could only have
decided in one step: it must have determined liability and calculated damages for X
directly on the basis of Mericle’s average without inferring anything about her actual time.
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reasonable time. Also, an inference from the sample average to actual
times might be acceptable if there were other evidence in the case
suggesting that employees took identical times. But Mericle’s
observations, the video evidence, and the trial testimony all showed
that Tyson employees took different times.80 To be sure, the
differences are quite small—measured in minutes per day—but those
minutes make a substantial difference to Tyson’s liability as well as to
the damages it owed individual employees.81
In addition, the sample average might have evidentiary value if it
supplemented individualized evidence of employee-specific times in
some probative way. But this is not how the Tyson Foods Court uses
it. The Court instead holds that the sample average itself can support
a factual determination of individual donning and doffing time.82 This
holding is far from obvious. Courts and commentators have long
struggled with the propriety of using aggregate statistics and base rate
probabilities to prove individualized liability elements in the absence
of more particularized, case-specific evidence—at least when the
substantive law does not clearly invite a statistical approach.83 Indeed,
80. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1055. For a case that refused to allow testimony
from a sample of employees to establish overtime compensation and minimum wage
violations for other employees in part because employee-specific facts varied too much,
see Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2013).
81. Indeed, slight deviations in the sample average had a substantial impact on the
number of employees with valid overtime claims, indicating that small differences in
donning and doffing times were significant. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1055 (“If
Mericle’s averages even slightly overestimated average donning and doffing times, another
282 class members would have no overtime claims. If average donning or doffing times
dropped from 18–21 minutes to 15 minutes, Fox stated, another 110 employees had no
overtime claims.”).
82. See id. at 1046–47 (majority opinion) (noting that because employees could use
the sample average to prove their times in individual suits, “that sample is a permissible
means of establishing the employees’ hours worked in a class action”). Indeed, if each
plaintiff had to supplement the sample average with individual evidence of donning and
doffing activity, it would have been very difficult for named plaintiffs to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. The sufficiency of the sample average ensured that
individual donning and doffing times could be proved on a class-wide basis and thus
facilitated a predominance finding. See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
83. See Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir. 1998)
(discussing some of the problems with relying exclusively on a base rate statistic to prove
an individual element, at least when it would be reasonable to expect case-specific
evidence); Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945) (rejecting the
sufficiency of the statistical evidence offered to identify the owner of a bus that caused an
accident); Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Essay, Collective Justice in Tort
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1486–87 (1992) (criticizing tort law’s individual, case-specific
focus and noting in particular “the traditional hostility of courts to statistical and
probabilistic evidence, which is aggregative in character, in favor of individual, ‘clinical’-
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the Tyson Foods Court itself recognized that the evidentiary
sufficiency of the sample average requires special justification. For
that purpose, the Court relied on the fact that Tyson failed to keep
records of individual times as required by the FLSA, that its failure
deprived employees of the ability to prove their actual times
precisely, and that allowing use of the sample average filled the
evidentiary gap and facilitated enforcement of the FLSA’s important
substantive policies.84
Rather than trying a sample and averaging the sample verdicts,
the trial judge in Tyson Foods relied on experts to find the facts in a
sample of cases and allowed the jury to modify the sample average in
light of testimonial and video evidence.85 But the key point is the
same: the sample average is what controlled the outcome, not
individualized fact finding, and as a result, some employees received
more than their substantive entitlements and some received less.86
It is true that the Court uses the sample average to support a
rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption of actual donning
and doffing times.87 However, since Tyson kept no records of donning
and doffing time, it could not rebut the presumption. So for all
practical purposes, the presumption was conclusive.
type evidence”); see also Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122
YALE L.J. 1254, 1269 & n.30, 1271 (2013) (noting that “courts have generally rejected
awarding damages to the plaintiff based on . . . ‘naked’ statistical evidence” and tend to
favor “individualized ‘direct’ proof”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 810 (2001) (noting the
preference of judges for individuating evidence over statistical evidence); Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1343–44, 1377 (1971) (noting that courts have been reluctant to rely on statistical
evidence as sufficient alone and recommending great caution in the use of mathematical
proof); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics,
and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001,
1050–51 (1988) (noting that “[j]udges generally have refused to accept naked statistics or
ex ante causal probabilities as evidence of what actually happened on a particular
occasion” and observing that “[t]hey instead have insisted on particularistic evidence and
ex post causal probabilities based on such evidence”).
84. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047; see also infra notes 121–127 and
accompanying text.
85. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44. This is similar to the way the court
structured statistical adjudication in Hilao. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767,
782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
86. Tyson Foods is unusual in going to trial; most class actions settle. The fact that it
went to trial and that Tyson’s motion was filed after the trial verdict allowed the Court to
defer heavily to the jury’s decision, or more precisely, to its characterization of the jury’s
decision. It is worth noting, however, that in most cases, the permissibility of statistical
adjudication will have to be decided much earlier, at the initial stage of class certification.
87. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
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To be sure, when population variance is small, the sample
average can be a reasonably good approximation of actual times. But
this evidentiary benefit is not enough alone to justify shifting the
burden to the defendant where there is case-specific evidence to
support more accurate individual results or where individualized
sampling is possible and likely to produce better estimates. In other
words, there must be some special reason that justifies the use of
aggregate sampling, regardless of whether it creates a conclusive or a
rebuttable presumption. In Tyson Foods, that reason had to do with
the evidentiary obstacle to enforcement created by the defendant’s
failure to keep adequate records and the importance of enabling
private enforcement of the FLSA’s substantive policies.88 Thus, Tyson
Foods is similar to other statistical adjudication cases—the sample
average is justified for its enforcement benefits and not merely for its
probative value.
2. Inference of Liability and Damages?
Having characterized the issue in terms of evidentiary inference,
the Court then turned to the task of justifying the inference. To do
this, it relied on a 1946 decision, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co.89 The Court read Mt. Clemens to hold that a rebuttable inference
of liability and damages based on the sample average was permissible
in individual FLSA suits whenever the employer failed to keep
adequate records of employee time.90 From this, it concluded that the

88. See infra Sections III.A.1.–.2.
89. 328 U.S. 680 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61
Stat. 84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012)). Mt. Clemens was a
representative suit for violation of the FLSA brought by a union and seven of its members
on behalf of all similarly situated employees, in which about 300 employees and exemployees authorized the plaintiffs to represent them. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v.
Anderson, 149 F.2d 461, 461 (6th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
90. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. Actually, it is not exactly clear how the district
judge calculated the average time estimates in Mt. Clemens. The judge referred the case to
a special master who, after hearing testimony from a number of witnesses, concluded that
the computation of overtime would be too speculative to support recovery. See Mt.
Clemens, 149 F.2d at 463–64. The district judge disagreed with the special master’s
conclusion and created a formula based on what the Sixth Circuit refers to as an
“estimated average of overtime worked.” See id. at 464–65. But it is not clear how the
district judge calculated this “estimated average.” In the end, the Sixth Circuit held that
“the arbitrary formula applied by the district judge, in lieu of acceptance of the master’s
findings, produced a judgment based upon surmise and conjecture, which cannot be
sustained.” Id. at 465. But the Supreme Court reversed. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687. It
held that when the employer fails to keep adequate time records, employees can prove
their individual times by evidence sufficient to support a “just and reasonable inference.”
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same inference applied to a class action aggregating those individual
FLSA claims.91
The trouble with relying on Mt. Clemens is that it did not go as
far as the Tyson Foods Court assumes. The Mt. Clemens Court
authorized the use of sampling to estimate damages, but only after
liability was already established:
In such a situation [where the employer fails to keep statutorily
mandated records,] we hold that an employee has carried out
his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for
which he was improperly compensated and if he produces
sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work
as a matter of just and reasonable inference. . . . Nor is such a
result to be condemned by the rule that precludes the recovery
of uncertain and speculative damages. That rule applies only to
situations where the fact of damage is itself uncertain. But here
we are assuming that the employee has proved that he has
performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the
statute. The damage is therefore certain. The uncertainty lies
only in the amount of damages arising from the statutory
violation by the employer.92
It is more difficult to justify the use of sampling to determine
liability.93 I shall argue below that stretching Mt. Clemens to cover
Id. But it also remanded “for the determination of the amount of walking time involved
and the amount of preliminary activities performed, giving due consideration to the de
minimis doctrine and calculating the resulting damages under the Act.” Id. at 694.
91. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47. The Mt. Clemens rule allowing sampling
is, of course, a rule of federal law, raising the question of why it applies to the state-created
IWPCL claim. The most likely answer is that the IWPCL claim is a hybrid state-federal
claim that incorporates the rule. The IWPCL statute requires an employer to “pay all
wages due its employees” but does not specify what wages are due. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 91A.3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.). The plaintiffs in Tyson Foods relied on
the FLSA to fill the gap. As the district judge noted, this made the IWPCL claim
“essentially ‘duplicative’ of the FLSA claim.” Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 870, 883–84 (N.D. Iowa 2008). It follows that the Mt. Clemens rule, as a
substantive component of the FLSA right, applies to the IWPCL claim as well:
The parties do not dispute that, in order to prove a violation of the Iowa statute,
the employees had to do no more than demonstrate a violation of the FLSA. In
this opinion, then, no distinction is made between the requirements for the class
action raising the state-law claims and the collective action raising the federal
claims.
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1045.
92. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687–88 (emphasis added).
93. It is worth noting, however, that some lower courts, before Tyson Foods, had
extended Mt. Clemens to proof of liability as well as damages in FLSA cases. See, e.g.,
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liability makes sense as a policy matter. But it is significant to note
here that the Tyson Foods majority fudged the issue rather than
openly concede what it was doing and explicitly justify the broader
use on legal and policy grounds.94
3. Trial by Formula?
The Tyson Foods Court also had to deal with Wal-Mart’s
rejection of sampling as “Trial by Formula.”95 This was not easy to do
because the use of statistical adjudication in Tyson Foods was
structurally very similar to its use in Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart was a
putative class action brought on behalf of roughly 1.5 million female
employees of Wal-Mart Stores nationwide.96 The class alleged Title
VII disparate treatment claims based on a company-wide policy of
gender discrimination in pay and promotion.97 The district court
certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for injunctive, declaratory, and
backpay relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.98 With respect to
backpay, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court might use
a sampling procedure that involved appointing a special master to

Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 770 F.3d 1300, 1307 (10th Cir. 2014) (allowing representative
evidence to prove liability in a FLSA case). Still, it is much easier to justify the use of
sampling at the damages stage. It is well established that a plaintiff need only propose a
method for estimating damages that permits a “ ‘just and reasonable inference’ . . . even
though the result is only an approximation.” Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods
Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 173 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)). One reason for this liberal
approach is the unfairness of imposing the risk of uncertain measurement on a plaintiff
when the defendant is a proven wrongdoer.
94. This is especially striking in light of Justice Thomas’s dissent, which takes the
majority to task for misinterpreting Mt. Clemens in precisely this way. Tyson Foods, 136 S.
Ct. at 1058 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
96. Id. at 342.
97. Id. at 343.
98. See id. at 346–47. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action for injunctive and
declaratory relief when the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). While the Rule says
nothing about monetary relief, lower courts before Wal-Mart routinely allowed backpay
claims under the Rule 23(b)(2) umbrella on the theory that backpay was merely incidental
to Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d
311, 332 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur prior cases have held that Rule 23(b)(2) class certification
is proper in the Title VII context . . . because injunctive or declaratory relief predominates
despite the presence of a request for back pay.”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Back pay has been granted by courts in (b)(2) class actions
where injunctive or declaratory relief has also been requested . . . .”).
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depose a random sample of class members and extrapolating from the
sample results to an aggregate backpay award.99
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the named
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate sufficient commonality for class
certification.100 The Court also held that a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
could not include backpay claims and criticized the Ninth Circuit’s
proposed sampling procedure.101 With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2)
backpay issue, the Court explained that in a Title VII case like WalMart, each class member has a presumptive entitlement to backpay
once the class succeeds in proving a pattern and practice of
discrimination.102 But Title VII then gives the employer the right to
rebut the presumption for each employee if it can show lawful reasons
for the employee’s particular treatment.103 The Supreme Court
concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s sampling procedure deprived the
defendant of its right to rebut the presumption in each individual
case—i.e., its right “to litigate its statutory defenses to individual
claims”—and thus altered the substantive law in violation of the
REA.104
The similarities to Tyson Foods are striking. In both cases, most
class members had claims for monetary relief that were too small to
support individual suits and therefore the only realistic way to
provide relief was through a class action or other form of aggregation.
In both cases, aggregate treatment was possible only if the court could
calculate an aggregate award on a class-wide basis. In both cases,
courts either proposed or implemented a form of statistical
99. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. The Ninth Circuit described its proposed
approach as follows:
A sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for sex
discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in
depositions supervised by a master. The percentage of claims determined to be
valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the number of
(presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be multiplied by the average
backpay award in the sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery—without
further individualized proceedings.
Id. (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 625–27 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 564
U.S. 338 (2011)). This proposal followed the approach used in Hilao. See Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–84 (9th Cir. 1996); see also supra note 21–24 and accompanying
text.
100. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 359.
101. See id. at 366–67.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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adjudication to do this. And in both cases, the sample average was
used to determine liability as well as damages.105
Despite these similarities, the Tyson Foods Court managed to
distinguish Wal-Mart. To do so, it focused on the heterogeneity of the
two employee classes. According to the Court, the wide differences in
employee circumstances across all Wal-Mart stores made the
nationwide class too heterogeneous to permit the use of a sample
average.106 In Tyson Foods, by contrast, “each employee worked in
the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same
policy.”107 This made the Tyson employee class much less
heterogeneous, which justified application of the Mt. Clemens rule
and allowed reliance on the sample average.108
There are two notable problems with this line of reasoning. First,
it does not match what the Court actually said in Wal-Mart. In WalMart, the problem with sampling was that it deprived the company of
its right “to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”109
Given this, it is a bit surprising that the Tyson Foods Court relied on
intra-class heterogeneity to distinguish Wal-Mart when it could have
relied on the fact that a rebuttable presumption allows the defendant
to present its defenses. Perhaps the Court worried that its supposedly
rebuttable presumption was not actually rebuttable after all and that
using the sample average to shift the burden on an element of the
prima facie case when the defendant has no way to rebut the
presumption is not all that different from cutting off a defense.110 In

105. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046–47 (2016); Wal-Mart
Stores, 564 U.S. at 367. In Wal-Mart, the liability issue was whether Wal-Mart had lawful
reasons for treating a particular employee the way it did. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at
366–67. In Tyson Foods, the liability issue was whether any given employee actually
worked overtime. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
106. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048. The Court reasoned that this intra-class
heterogeneity precluded the use of the sample average in an individual case, and then
concluded that the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) precluded its use in a class action as well.
Id. (“Permitting the use of that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated the
Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class
proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action.”).
107. Id.
108. Actually, the Court argues that since Mt. Clemens allowed the sample average to
be used in an individual suit, it must also be available in a class action, or else there would
be a REA violation. See id. at 1047–48.
109. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367.
110. The Tyson Foods Court noted that “[s]ince there were no alternative means for
the employees to establish their hours worked [besides the sample average], [Tyson’s]
primary defense was to show that Mericle’s study was unrepresentative or inaccurate.”
Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047. In other words, there was no point in giving Tyson a
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any event, it is not clear what heterogeneity has to do with a right to
litigate individual defenses. As long as the cases exhibit legally
relevant differences, Wal-Mart would seem to require individual
litigation. And legally relevant differences can exist even when a class
has low heterogeneity.
Second, Tyson Foods confuses Wal-Mart’s discussion of Rule
23(a)(2) commonality with its discussion of Rule 23(b)(2) backpay
relief.111 It is true that the Wal-Mart Court emphasized the sprawling
and internally heterogeneous nature of the class, but it did so in the
course of holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide enough evidence
of a company-wide discriminatory policy to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality requirement.112 The Rule 23(b)(2) backpay issue is
different. It arises only after the plaintiffs prove the existence of a
company-wide policy of discrimination, since it is only then that the
presumptive right to backpay attaches.113 This makes a huge
difference. If Wal-Mart actually has a company-wide discriminatory
policy affecting pay and promotion, then that policy lends cohesion to
the class and makes it more homogeneous than the Tyson Foods
Court assumes. Indeed, it is not clear which is more heterogeneous: a
Wal-Mart class subject to a company-wide discriminatory policy or a
Tyson Foods class with substantial overtime variations.114
Of course, the Tyson Foods Court had to do something to disarm
Wal-Mart, and distinguishing precedent by reinterpreting it is a triedand-true strategy. But the way the Court distinguished Wal-Mart
creates a problem for the use of sampling in other aggregations. The
Court reasons that sampling is proper in class actions only because it
is proper in individual suits.115 Thus, the permissibility of sampling in
chance to defend against individual claims because it had nothing to present by way of
defense. This brings the Tyson Foods case rather close to Wal-Mart. The point of WalMart is that sample averaging deprives parties of their right to litigate individual issues by
averaging over individual facts. Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367.
111. For example, the Tyson Foods Court says: “The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart proposed
to use representative evidence as a means of overcoming [the] absence of a common
policy [for purposes of determining an aggregate backpay award].” Tyson Foods, 136 S.
Ct. at 1048. This is simply wrong. The “representative evidence” in Wal-Mart was to be
used to determine backpay only after plaintiffs proved the existence of a common policy.
See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 367.
112. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 356–60.
113. Id. at 336–37.
114. The existence of a company-wide discriminatory policy is a good reason to believe
that most employees suffered from discrimination, whereas the fact that Tyson employees
worked in the same plant and were paid under the same gang-time system says nothing
about their individual donning and doffing times.
115. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048.
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individual suits is a necessary condition for the use of sampling in class
actions. This limitation ignores important differences between a class
action and an individual suit, differences that sometimes make
sampling desirable in the former when it might not be desirable in the
latter. This point is discussed at greater length in Part III below.
III. THE FUTURE OF SAMPLING AFTER TYSON FOODS
The Tyson Foods Court expressly disavows “broad and
categorical rules” and endorses a case-specific approach.116 It opens
the door to broader use of sampling but provides little guidance to
lower court judges, who must decide when and how to use it. The
following discussion develops factors and principles to guide those
decisions. Section A unpacks the factors that the Court actually
identifies; Section B addresses sampling’s outcome effects; and
Section C discusses some other relevant factors that should be taken
into consideration.
A word of clarification is in order at the outset. The following
account is not the only reasonable interpretation of the Tyson Foods
opinion. I offer it as the best principled interpretation. My claim is
that the general principles that best fit and justify what the Court says
and does in Tyson Foods have normative extension and justify
sampling in a wider range of cases.
A. The Court’s Factors
The Tyson Foods Court mentions two factors that it considers
relevant to the use of sampling: (1) “the purpose for which the sample
is being introduced,” and (2) “the underlying cause of action.”117 In
addition, the Court makes clear in its discussion of Wal-Mart that the
degree of heterogeneity matters, and it also notes that any sampling
methodology must be reliable.118

116. Id. at 1049.
117. Id. (“The fairness and utility of statistical methods in contexts other than those
presented here will depend on facts and circumstances particular to those cases.”); see also
id. at 1046 (“It follows that the Court would reach too far were it to establish general rules
governing the use of statistical evidence, or so-called representative evidence, in all classaction cases.”).
118. Id. at 1046 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 401, 403, 702) (stating that the permissibility of a
statistical sample “turns . . . on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or
disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action”).
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1. The Purpose of Sampling
The Court says little about the first factor, and its meaning is far
from clear. As we have seen, sampling is sometimes used to generate
statistical evidence helpful for determining case-specific facts.119 But
this is not how it is used in Tyson Foods. The sample average is not
just evidence of actual donning and doffing times; it is the time that
determines liability for each employee.120
When justifying the sample average, the Court relies on Tyson’s
failure to keep adequate records of donning and doffing times.121
Given this, one might reasonably read the Tyson Foods holding as
limited to cases where the sample average is needed to overcome an
evidentiary obstacle created by the defendant.122 However, I believe
119. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
120. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1046–47. More precisely, the sample average in
Tyson Foods shifts the burden to the defendant. See id. at 1047. In this respect, it might
seem analogous to other doctrines that shift the burden on liability issues when rebuttal
evidence is unlikely, such as the burden-shifting rule of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4–5
(Cal. 1948), or market share theories in products liability, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607
P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). These analogies are useful, but they are also different from
Tyson Foods in important ways. For one thing, the FLSA duty is statutory, and the statute
prescribes that liability attaches only if the employee worked overtime. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (2012). The Summers burden rule and market share theories are common law
doctrines, and judges have more latitude to alter the liability elements of common law
torts. Moreover, both of the common law burden-shifting rules apply only when the
plaintiff proves that the defendant violated a legal standard owed to her. See Sindell, 607
P.2d at 936; Summers, 199 P.2d at 3–4. In Summers v. Tice, for example, the plaintiff
proved that both shooters were negligent; the only question was whose bullet actually hit
the plaintiff. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 2. Market share theories impose liability based on a
probabilistic estimate that the plaintiff used the particular brand, but they presuppose that
the product itself is defective or the defendants are otherwise legal wrongdoers. See
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925–26, 936–37. To be sure, the Mericle and Fox studies make clear
that Tyson failed to pay proper overtime compensation to some employees and thus
violated the FLSA as to them. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1043–44. But Tyson did not
fail to pay overtime for every employee who benefited from the presumption. In other
words, the Tyson Foods Court shifts the burden for all employees in the class without any
proof that the FLSA overtime compensation duty was violated for each and every one. See
id. at 1047–49.
121. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047.
122. In a draft article finalized too late for me to respond to here, Jonah Gelbach
argues that Tyson Foods treats the sample average similar to how courts treat
counterfactual evidence in other cases. Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the
Role of Evidence in Class Litigation, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 9–12, 23), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2905911 [https://perma.cc/QVN6-6X53
(staff-uploaded archive)]. I disagree. In the antitrust cases involving counterfactual
evidence, for example, statistical evidence is required by the inherent nature of the
substantive issue. See supra text accompanying note 11. The problem in Tyson Foods is
different. Tyson employees actually worked the time they did; there is no need to posit a
hypothetical state of affairs in order to make sense of the required liability element. The
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that a broader interpretation better fits the Court’s reasoning.
According to this interpretation, the existence of an evidentiary gap is
not the crux of the problem; it is just the particular way that the
problem manifested itself in the Tyson Foods case. Quoting Mt.
Clemens, the Tyson Foods Court emphasized the “remedial nature”
of the FLSA, the “great public policy . . . it embodies,” and the
injustice of leaving an employer free to retain the benefits of
employee work without paying for those benefits.123 It never said that
these policy concerns are triggered only when enforcement is difficult
because of an evidentiary gap. The existence of an evidentiary gap
happened to be the enforcement obstacle in Tyson Foods and Mt.
Clemens, but the reason why the gap mattered—that it frustrated the
enforcement of important substantive policies—potentially extends to
any obstacle that has the same effect.
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the Court
never treated Tyson’s failure to keep adequate records as a spoliation
tort, nor did it limit its holding to situations where the defendant
purposefully alters evidence in order to avoid liability.124 If Tyson had
been guilty of spoliation, shifting the burden might have been justified
on moral and evidentiary grounds.125 But the Court did not rely on the
spoliation doctrine. Indeed, Tyson might have chosen not to keep
adequate records simply because it believed—wrongly as it turned
out—that its K-code times covered its FLSA obligations and thus that
it did not have to incur the cost of keeping track of the daily donning
and doffing times for each of its more than three thousand
employees.126

evidentiary gap does not inhere in the nature of the overtime issue; it arises from Tyson’s
failure to keep records. Thus, use of the sample average must be justified in a different
way.
123. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat.
84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012))); see Anderson, 328 U.S. at
688 (“[T]he employer, having received the benefits of such work, cannot object to the
payment for the work on the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances.”).
124. The spoliation doctrine allows a court to presume facts when a party manipulates
the evidence so that the opposing party cannot prove the fact. See Lawrence Solum &
Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36
EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087–94 (1987) (explaining the spoliation inference).
125. See id. at 1138–40.
126. Cf. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority thus
puts employers to an untenable choice. They must either track any time that might be the
subject of an innovative lawsuit, or they must defend class actions against representative
evidence that unfairly homogenizes an individual issue.”).
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Moreover, it is not even clear that violation of a statutory recordkeeping duty is a necessary condition for application of the Mt.
Clemens rule. Some courts have applied Mt. Clemens without a
record-keeping violation.127 This is consistent with the notion that
sampling’s purpose is to enforce FLSA rights and secure the statute’s
compensation and deterrence goals rather than to punish the
defendant or incentivize record keeping.
Thus, Tyson Foods, broadly interpreted, stands for the
proposition that sampling can be used to overcome any serious proof
obstacle that systematically deprives a large number of injured parties
of compensation, impedes enforcement of the substantive law, and
leaves the defendant free to retain the benefits of its unlawful
conduct—provided, of course, that sampling is otherwise consistent
with the applicable substantive law.128 This proposition and the
principles it embodies apply not just to FLSA claims but also to the
collective litigation of consumer protection, securities fraud, antitrust,
and other cases involving small claims.129 In cases like these, the
127. See Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., Nos. 12-cv-04137-JCS, 13-3091-JCS, 2016 WL
1598663, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (construing Tyson Foods and Mt. Clemens to
extend to situations where the employer’s failure to keep adequate records does not
violate an explicit record-keeping duty). Nor does it matter that the defendant had reason
to rely on third parties to keep records. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
independent contractors should have kept the records). Moreover, the Mt. Clemens Court
itself noted that its rule applied “even where the lack of accurate records grows out of a
bona fide mistake as to whether certain activities or non-activities constitute work.” Mt.
Clemens, 328 U.S. at 688. And a similar principle has been applied in other contexts that
do not involve statutory record-keeping violations. See Melgar v. CSK Auto, Inc., No. 13cv-03769-EMC, 2015 WL 9303977, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (allowing plaintiffs to
rely on self-identification to satisfy the ascertainability requirement for class certification
partly because the defendant failed to keep records and “even if there is no statute that
explicitly requires recordkeeping for business expenses”).
128. It is also important to bear in mind that while overcoming serious proof obstacles
supports sampling, there might be contrary principles weighing against its use in particular
cases or rules that dictate a different result. For example, applied to most state claims,
sampling would almost certainly be considered “substantive” and thus available only if the
applicable state law allows it. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see
also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 321 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding inter alia
that the district court’s use of sampling impermissibly altered state substantive law in
violation of the Erie command).
129. It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to embrace this
proposition in the arbitration context when negative expected value claims are involved.
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), for example,
the Court held that a class waiver was enforceable in arbitration even though the plaintiffs’
federal antitrust claims were too small to justify proceeding individually. Id. at 2309–11
(holding that the effective vindication doctrine applies to the “ ‘prospective waiver of a
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’ . . . . [b]ut the fact that it is not worth the
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the
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defendant’s unlawful conduct systematically produces small harms to
large numbers of geographically dispersed individuals.130 The obstacle
to enforcement is not an evidentiary gap, but a negative expected
value (“NEV”) problem.131 Most plaintiffs have too little at stake to
cover the costs of an individual suit. Aggregation makes suit feasible
by attracting an attorney willing to represent the group in return for a
percentage of the total recovery. The problem with aggregation,
however, is the presence of individual reliance, causation, and
damages issues.132 Sampling solves this problem by enabling collective
resolution of individual issues.
Based on this interpretation, the Court’s purpose factor should
support the use of statistical adjudication in a case like Wal-Mart. The
backpay claims in Wal-Mart were for small amounts, too small to
justify individual suits. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s proposed sampling
procedure removed a NEV obstacle that deprived claimants of their
entitlement to recover backpay and impeded the enforcement of Title
VII rights.133 The Supreme Court invoked the REA to reject the
Ninth Circuit’s approach,134 and I shall discuss that argument later.
For now, it is important to note that the purpose factor weighs in
favor of sampling in a case like Wal-Mart.

right to pursue that remedy” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985))). It is difficult to see how this holding can be
justified as a matter of procedural principle detached from the Federal Arbitration Act
and the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, and it is unclear whether and how far
the Court will apply it beyond the arbitration context. I am grateful to Maria Glover for
alerting me to this point.
130. For a discussion noting the benefits and costs of small claims class actions, see
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
131. In other words, the expected cost of litigating an individual suit exceeds the
expected recovery, so the suit has a negative expected value. See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20–36 (2003) (explaining expected
value and negative expected value suits).
132. For example, these individual issues can make it difficult to satisfy the
predominance requirement for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. See Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 792–807 (2013). These
individual issues might be left to individual suits, but the cost of those suits, even narrowed
to just these issues, is likely to be prohibitive given the small amounts at stake.
133. Given the centrality of Wal-Mart’s individual defenses to backpay claims, see WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011), it would have been very difficult to
satisfy the predominance requirement for a Rule 23(b)(3) class action without the use of
sampling.
134. Id.

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

638

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

Tyson Foods is very similar to Wal-Mart in this regard. It is
actually better understood as a small claims case with a NEV obstacle
than a case with an evidentiary gap.135 The assumption that plaintiffs
cannot prove liability without using the sample average is highly
questionable. All Dr. Mericle did was average current donning and
doffing times for a random sample of current employees. He had no
access to historical information; Tyson kept no historical records of
donning and doffing time. But this means that there was nothing
stopping an individual employee from hiring Mericle or some other
expert to videotape her own donning and doffing activity and average
her personal times. Employee-specific averages would approximate
individual donning and doffing times better than the employee-wide
sample average used in the case. Thus, it is simply not true that Tyson
employees had no alternative but to use Mericle’s sample averages.
They could have used their own individual averages instead, and
those would have produced more accurate liability determinations.136
The problem is that many, if not all, Tyson employees had too
little at stake to justify the expense of an individual time study.
Moreover, employee-specific time studies would make the overtime
issue an individual one, which could easily scuttle the aggregate
treatment needed to overcome the NEV obstacle. If this is the
problem, though, then statistical adjudication serves the same
purpose in Tyson Foods as in Wal-Mart or any other case involving
small claims: it removes a NEV obstacle to private enforcement of the
substantive law.137
135. If Tyson had kept adequate records of donning and doffing times, employees
presumably would have had to prove their overtime on an individualized basis. But that
would have involved an easy mathematical calculation suitable for a computer and thus
should not have scuttled aggregate treatment. However, if overtime involved a more
complex analysis, for some reason, then the negative expected value (“NEV”)
interpretation of Tyson Foods would support the use of sampling to enable aggregation—
even if Tyson had kept individual time records.
136. The class also included some former employees, and it would not be possible to
videotape their current donning and doffing times since they no longer don and doff. But
it would have been possible to videotape staged donning and doffing sessions by former
employees. These employees might need some practice to remember how to do it, but
afterward, their current times are likely to be a better approximation of their actual
historical times than Mericle’s sample average.
137. It is worth noting, however, that private enforcement is not the only option for
employees in these cases. The FLSA also authorizes suit by the Department of Labor to
recover the same monetary relief that employees can obtain. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2012);
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
public enforcement alternative). Even so, the FLSA clearly contemplates private
enforcement, and the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of private enforcement to
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2. The Underlying Cause of Action
The second of the Court’s two factors—the underlying cause of
action—also needs fleshing out. The elements of the cause of action
define the legal and factual issues that are candidates for sampling,
and the source of the cause of action—state or federal—affects
whether a federal court must follow state law if sampling is
substantive for Erie purposes.138 These are obvious points. But the
cause-of-action factor plays another important role in the analysis.
The substantive policies underlying the cause of action are critical to
the justification for using sampling.
The Tyson Foods Court makes this point clear when, quoting Mt.
Clemens, it ties sampling to the “remedial nature of [the FLSA] and
the great public policy which it embodies.”139 The Court does refer to
the FLSA as a “remedial” statute and invokes the principle that
remedial statutes should be construed generously.140 On a quick
reading, this might lead one to conclude that sampling should be
limited to remedial statutes. But this conclusion would be a mistake.
There is no such thing as a special class of remedial statutes; every
statute that provides remedies for legal wrongs is remedial.141 At
most, the “remedial” label means that the policies underlying the
statute strongly support providing relief to the favored group and thus
realizing the policy goals of the Act. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S.
680, 687–88 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84,
86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012)).
138. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
139. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (alteration in
original) (quoting Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687).
140. See id. Other courts have relied on the remedial nature of the FLSA as support for
interpreting its collective action provision liberally. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (relying on the “broad remedial goal” of the FLSA to
authorize trial judge assistance with giving notice of the collective action to employees);
Church v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that
because the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) “is a remedial statute
which is to be liberally construed in light of its purpose,” ADEA plaintiffs bringing a
FLSA collective action do not have to show predominance of common questions to get
conditional certification and thus be able to invite other employees to join in).
141. As the Seventh Circuit observed in a case involving the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”),
Plaintiffs stress that the LMRDA is a remedial measure and seek a liberal
construction. This maxim is useless in deciding concrete cases. Every statute is
remedial in the sense that it alters the law or favors one group over
another. . . . [A]fter we determine that a law favors some group, the question
becomes: How much does it favor them?
Stomper v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1994).
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that the statute should be construed in a way that facilitates that
goal.142 But this applies to any statutory claim that promotes strong
substantive policies.
It would also be a mistake to conclude from the fact that the
FLSA expressly authorizes a collective action that sampling should be
limited to only those statutory claims that include explicit class action,
collective action, or other aggregation provisions.143 For one thing, the
fact that a statute is silent does not mean that Congress does not value
enforcement through aggregation. Congress might simply have
assumed that there was no need for explicit authorization because
Rule 23 or some other aggregation device was already available.144
More importantly, the reason that Congress empowers aggregation
for statutory claims is because it believes that aggregation is
important to the enforcement of the statute’s substantive policies.145
Thus, it is those policies that matter, not the presence or absence of
congressional authorization.146
This is exactly how the Tyson Foods Court justifies sampling—by
reference to the underlying statutory policies, not the statutory text.147
142. See id.
143. Some courts have relied on the presence of the collective action provision to
justify rules that facilitate employee use of the device. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche, 493
U.S. at 170.
144. Indeed, the reason for the FLSA’s collective action provision is not just to
empower aggregation but also to limit aggregation to an opt-in procedure. See Daniel C.
Lopez, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the
Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 283–84 (2009) (summarizing the 1947
amendments to the FLSA).
145. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173 (equating Congress’s decision to
leave the FLSA’s aggregation provision “intact” with the courts’ duty to ensure that the
“broad remedial goal of the statute . . . [is] enforced to the full extent of its terms”);
Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 402 n.8 (6th Cir. 1980) (referring to the
“congressional purpose” behind the Truth in Lending Act’s class action provision as
“using the threat of a class action to force compliance with the Act” and cautioning that
subverting the class action could render “the prophylactic effect of class liability
exposure . . . nonexistent”); G. W. Foster, Jr., Jurisdiction, Rights, and Remedies for Group
Wrongs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: Special Federal Questions, 1975 WIS. L. REV.
295, 309 (arguing that the FLSA’s collective action provision was necessary to enforce the
anti-unfair-competition purpose of the statute).
146. It would matter if the statute explicitly authorized, or rejected, sampling, not just
aggregation. But the FLSA says nothing about sampling, and very few statutes do. For an
example of a statute that expressly authorizes sampling, see 15 U.S.C. § 15d (2012)
(authorizing statistical sampling to measure damages in a parens patriae antitrust action).
147. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016) (relying on the
“remedial nature” of and the “great public policy” behind the FLSA (quoting Anderson v.
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14,
1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat. 84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012)))).
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It enlists the FLSA’s substantive policies to justify sampling in an
individual suit.148 It then concludes that if sampling is available in an
individual suit, it must also be available in a Rule 23 class action
because of the REA.149
Drawing on substantive law policies to justify the use of sampling
makes sense in general. The primary goal of adjudication is to enforce
the substantive law, and the point of enforcement is to promote the
policies that the substantive law serves. Since the reason to use
sampling is to better enforce those policies, the case for it must be
stronger when those policies are stronger.
More precisely, in any litigation, the substantive policies at stake
affect the magnitude of the expected error costs from using a
procedure. Sometimes plaintiffs recover when the defendant is not in
fact liable (a false positive error), and sometimes they fail to recover
when the defendant is in fact liable (a false negative error).150 Each of
these two types of error generates its own costs, both to the losing
party and to society at large (as the term is used here, “costs” include
all types of negative effects, including moral as well as economic
harms). Procedures often reduce one type of error while increasing
the other. This is true for sampling. A sampling procedure reduces
false negatives by enabling deserving plaintiffs to recover, but it also
increases false positives by allowing everyone in the class to recover,
including those who have suffered no legal wrong. Whether sampling
is justified, therefore, depends on the relative costs of these two types
of error. And those costs must be measured in terms of the
substantive law values at stake.151
148. See id. It is also worth mentioning that basing FLSA liability on average times has
a certain normative appeal. An average time is likely to be a reasonable time, and a
reasonableness standard might seem an appropriate measure of an employer’s obligation
in this context. It is possible that the normative appeal of the sample average in these
FLSA suits contributed to the Court’s willingness to authorize its use in the case.
However, the Court never mentioned this point and relying on it to justify the sample
average would be tantamount to altering the FLSA, which could create separation-ofpowers and REA problems. I am indebted to my colleague Larry Sager for alerting me to
this point.
149. See id. at 1046.
150. For a more comprehensive account of error costs, see BONE, supra note 131, at
128–46.
151. There are two additional complications. First, expected process costs also matter.
Process costs include all the costs of applying the sampling procedure, including the costs
of hearings to decide whether to use it, the costs of designing it, and the costs of actually
implementing it. Id. at 146. Second, the optimal balance of expected error and process
costs depends on one’s normative theory of procedure and, in particular, on whether that
theory is efficiency-based or rights-based. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7,
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The Tyson Foods Court reads the FLSA as placing a very high
social value on vindicating employee rights. In effect, the Court
assumes that false negatives—denying compensation to deserving
employees—are much more costly than false positives—forcing
employers to pay compensation to some employees whose FLSA
rights have not been violated. This is the point of emphasizing the
“remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it
embodies.”152 Under these circumstances, a procedure like sampling,
which reduces the more costly false negative error, is desirable as long
as it does not increase false positives by too much.153
In sum, the Court’s cause-of-action factor and its purpose factor
work together to justify sampling. If the purpose of sampling is to
remove a serious barrier to relief and if removing that barrier enables
enforcement of important social policies served by the cause of
action, without seriously impairing other relevant policies, then there
is a strong argument for sampling.
3. Heterogeneity and Reliability
As we have seen, the Tyson Foods Court distinguishes Wal-Mart
by relying on the degree of heterogeneity within the employee
group.154 Heterogeneity matters because it affects the reliability of a
sampling methodology. The more that individuals within the
population differ from one another, the less certain it is that the
at 595–617 (analyzing statistical adjudication under efficiency-based and rights-based
theories).
152. Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1047 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute, Act of May 14, 1947, ch. 52, sec. 4, 61 Stat.
84, 86–87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012))).
153. As I explain below, the precise way this works is different for an efficiency theory
of procedure than for a rights-based theory. See infra Section III.B. In an efficiency theory,
for example, whether false positives are increased “by too much” depends on four
variables: (1) the cost of false positives, (2) the cost of false negatives, (3) the amount by
which sampling reduces the probability of false negatives, and (4) the amount by which
sampling reduces expected process (litigation) costs. See BONE, supra note 131, at 128–55
(describing an error cost analysis). To illustrate, suppose that the cost of a false negative is
20, the cost of a false positive is 10, sampling reduces the probability of a false negative
error by 10% (say from 20% to 10%), and sampling reduces expected process costs by 2.
In this stylized example, the expected benefit of sampling is the savings in false negative
error costs, which is 2 (i.e., 0.1 × 20 = 2) plus the savings in expected process costs, which is
also 2—for a total benefit of 4. Therefore, if sampling increases expected false positive
error costs by more than 4, costs would exceed benefits and sampling would not be
desirable. Given the assumption that the cost of a false positive error is 10, sampling would
increase expected false positive error costs by more than 4 if it increased the probability of
a false positive error by more than 40%.
154. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
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sample average is a good estimate of the population average or of
actual values for each individual. One can handle this problem by
using a larger sample size or a stratified sampling procedure (or
regression); however, doing so increases litigation costs.
For a utilitarian committed to economic efficiency, what matters
is the balance of costs and benefits.155 As heterogeneity increases, the
costs of adjusting the sampling procedure to compensate for it also
increase. At some point, the marginal costs exceed the marginal
benefits, and this is the point where the degree of heterogeneity bars
sampling.
For someone committed to a rights-based theory, heterogeneity
works a bit differently, but the conclusion is the same—it all depends
on the case. For example, as we shall see, a rights-based jurist can
accept sampling even when it produces a substantial divergence
between average recovery and actual entitlement if the alternative is
worse for rights. This was the case in Tyson Foods and Wal-Mart,
where plaintiffs would not have been able to recover at all without
the collective adjudication made possible through sampling.156
In sum, a properly designed sampling procedure should satisfy
heterogeneity constraints in many cases. This is because
heterogeneity is relevant mostly as a factor in determining the
reliability of the statistical methodology.157
B.

Justifying Sampling’s Outcome Effects

Sampling can produce more accurate outcomes than individual
trials if the heterogeneity of the aggregation is small enough and the

155. Actually, a utilitarian should be interested in the real world incentives generated
by the combination of substantive and procedural law. These incentives are affected by
outcome error, of course, but they can also be directly affected by procedure without
regard to effects on outcome error. For example, a procedural system that produces high
litigation costs might deter socially undesirable conduct in a direct way if actors anticipate
being sued when they violate the law and incur high litigation costs as a result. In other
words, high litigation costs are not just costs of the system; they are also benefits insofar as
they add to the procedural system’s deterrent effect. It follows that reducing litigation
costs can weaken deterrence, all other things equal. I ignore this refinement in the text.
156. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
157. Reliability is usually tested in a Daubert hearing. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It is also worth mentioning that judges
might need the assistance of neutral experts, perhaps appointed as special masters or as
expert witnesses, to evaluate and implement a reliable statistical approach. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 53 (authorizing the appointment of special masters); FED. R. EVID. 706 (allowing
the court to appoint expert witnesses).
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error risk of individual suits is large enough.158 When the aggregation
is nearly homogeneous, the sample average is quite a good estimate
of the correct result for every case. Indeed, this estimate could be
even better than the trial verdict in an individual suit if that verdict is
likely to deviate from the correct outcome by a large margin because
of a high risk of trial error.
However, these two conditions—low heterogeneity and large
individual trial error—are not easily satisfied. There is no assurance
that the aggregation will have low heterogeneity, especially with
respect to the individual issues for which sampling is used.159
Moreover, because of limited information, judges will have great
difficulty sorting between aggregations that meet the conditions and
aggregations that do not.160
Thus, we must address the fact that sampling can increase the
error risk for at least some, and perhaps many, cases in the
distribution and systematically distort outcomes relative to
substantive entitlements. In Tyson Foods, for example, the sample
average generated overtime liability for some employees who did not
in fact work overtime, and it also likely denied overtime liability for
some employees who did work overtime.161 Moreover, because
everyone receives the average, sampling overcompensates deserving
plaintiffs with below-average claims and undercompensates deserving
plaintiffs with above-average claims.
158. See Bavli, supra note 5, at 82–83 (demonstrating that sampling will reduce the
aggregate error risk on average if the variance of the aggregation, what Bavli calls “claim
variability,” is less than the error risk for an individual suit, what Bavli calls “judgment
variability”); Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 578–84 (noting that whether
sampling improves accuracy for all cases in the aggregation depends on the heterogeneity
of the aggregation and the error risk in an individual suit); Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the
Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 833–37 (1992). In considering the effect of
sampling on error risk, one must be careful to distinguish between aggregate effects and
case-specific effects. Sampling might reduce the expected error risk for the aggregation as
a whole, but still increase and also skew the error risk for cases far out on the tail of the
distribution. The aggregate effect is what matters for an efficiency theory, but, as we shall
see, case-specific effects matter for a rights-based theory.
159. As noted above, sampling is useful for overcoming the predominance obstacle to
certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
160. It might be possible to use sequential sampling to gather more information about
the population distribution, but this is complicated and can be costly. See Bavli, supra note
5, at 84–85.
161. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1055 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The latter cases would arise if an employee took longer than the average
donning and doffing time and the difference would have pushed the employee above forty
hours per week.
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The seriousness of these outcome effects depends on one’s
normative theory of procedure. A utilitarian committed to economic
efficiency cares only that outcomes generate optimal incentives
overall.162 Sampling fares well by this measure.163 As far as
defendant’s incentives are concerned, what matters is the defendant’s
total liability, and the sample average multiplied over all the cases in
the aggregation is a very good estimate of that.164 As for potential
plaintiffs, they adjust their pre-injury behavior according to what they
think will happen if they are injured. Thus, the fact that plaintiffs
receive more or less than their substantive entitlements is not a
problem for a utilitarian because pre-injury expectations average over
all possible cases, just as the sample average does.165 And even if
sampling introduces some distortion, the resulting social costs might
well be offset by the savings in litigation costs that sampling produces
in large enough case aggregations.
Skewed outcomes are more troubling for a rights-based
procedure theory. Roughly speaking, a rights-based theory assumes
that parties have procedural rights that trump or substantially
constrain arguments for limiting procedure based on minimizing
social costs, maximizing aggregate welfare, or pursuing collective

162. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 309–10 (1994) (focusing on how procedural accuracy affects ex ante
behavior and incentives).
163. This discussion is a summary of the analysis that I develop more fully in other
writing. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 595–98.
164. More precisely, what matters for a rational and risk-neutral defendant is expected
liability, and the sample average does a very good job of estimating expected liability for a
representative aggregation of cases and a large enough random sample. See BONE, supra
note 131, at 20–36 (explaining expected liability and expected value). Also, sampling
reduces outcome variance and thus should improve incentives for risk-averse defendants.
165. This is true as long as the aggregation is representative of the larger population of
potential cases and the sampling procedure is reliable. More precisely, a plaintiff’s ex ante
incentives depend on her expected recovery, and expected recovery is just an average over
all possible future cases. To illustrate, suppose that there are 100 plaintiffs; that the
defendant is not liable at all to 10 of these plaintiffs; and that among the 90 to whom it is
liable, 20 suffered damages of 30,000, 50 suffered damages of 20,000, and 20 suffered
damages of 10,000. If a sample of 10 cases is randomly drawn from the population of 100,
we would expect 1 case of no liability, 2 cases with 30,000 damages, 5 cases with 20,000
damages, and 2 cases with 10,000 damages. Assuming perfect accuracy, if all the
sample cases were tried, then
the sample
average
would equal:
[(1 × 0) + (2 × 30,000) + (5 × 20,000) + (2 × 10,000)] ÷ 10 = 18,000.
Therefore,
the
defendant’s total liability would be the sample average multiplied by the 100 cases in the
population, which is 18,000 × 100 = 1,800,000. This is exactly the same as the defendant’s
total liability if all cases were tried individually, again assuming perfectly accurate trials.
That total would be (10 × 0) + (20 × 30,000) + (50 × 20,000) + (20 × 10,000) = 1,800,000.
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social goals.166 The main problem from a rights-based perspective is
sampling’s impact on a plaintiff’s rights. To be sure, the defendant’s
rights matter just as much as the plaintiff’s. But defendant’s rights are
not seriously affected by a well-designed sampling procedure. This is
so because defendant’s total liability is roughly the same with
sampling as without, and defendant’s total liability is what should
matter to any sensible rights-based theory.167 The defendant pays
some plaintiffs more than it should but it pays others less than it
should, and the errors cancel out.
The effect on plaintiffs’ rights is more serious because errors do
not cancel on the plaintiffs’ side. Some plaintiffs receive less than
what their substantive rights guarantee and others receive more. Even
so, the distortion is not itself disqualifying. If it were, the Court’s
endorsement of sampling in Tyson Foods would be open to criticism.
More importantly, many of the situations where sampling makes the
most sense are situations where skewed outcomes can be justified
within a rights-based theory.168
For example, if individuals are unable to sue or recover without
the use of sampling, there is no reason to reject the procedure just
because it distorts outcomes. As discussed above, this is the situation
in Tyson Foods, as well as for the backpay claims in Wal-Mart.169 In
these cases, sampling makes it possible to satisfy rights claims that
would otherwise go unmet. There is no sensible rights-based ground
to complain about that result, at least as long as the sampling
procedure is designed to minimize distortions.
Also, even if individuals can sue and recover without sampling, it
matters that they save litigation costs with sampling.170 If the litigation
cost savings equal or exceed the shortfall due to averaging, a plaintiff
will be no worse off with sampling, and might even be better off than
she would in an individual suit, despite obtaining a formal judgment
166. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 93–94 (1985); Robert G.
Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural
Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 513–16 (2003).
167. Technically, the defendant’s procedural right attaches to each individual suit, not
to the aggregation as a whole. However, the distribution of error risk across cases is what
matters from a rights-based perspective. See infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
And a defendant has no ground to complain about a distribution that leaves its total
liability intact.
168. See generally Lahav, supra note 5 (defending the use of sampling on the ground
that it promotes outcome equality).
169. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
170. Professor Jay Tidmarsh relies on a similar point to justify his presumptive
judgment approach. See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 1487–88.
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or settlement less than what her right guarantees. This result should
satisfy any rights-based concerns.171
Moreover, there is no reason to worry about outcome effects
under a rights-based theory when a plaintiff consents to sampling.
Indeed, a plaintiff with a high-value claim can opt out of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action and does not need to join a FLSA collective
action if she believes she will fare worse with sampling.172 To be sure,
plaintiffs have imperfect information when they make opt-out or optin decisions, and it is more difficult to infer consent when a party
lacks some of the information necessary to make an informed choice.
But it is important to remember that parties make lots of outcomedeterminative choices in litigation with less-than-perfect information.
Finally, the essential consideration for a rights-based theory is
not the magnitude of the error risk itself but the distribution of that
risk across litigants and cases and, in particular, the reasons why it is
distributed the way it is.173 To see this point clearly, it is useful to
begin by noting that sampling’s effect in producing outcomes that

171. One might object that litigation cost savings should not be considered because
they are not part of the substantive right. However, this position is untenable. If litigationrelated costs are irrelevant, then it would not matter to a rights-based theory that a
plaintiff who files late in the litigation queue recovers very little or nothing at all because
of high delay costs or insufficient remaining assets. The formal judgment or settlement
would be enough even if it was (virtually) worthless in practical terms. No litigation system
that purports to respect rights can possibly be satisfied with such a result. For more on this
point, see Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 253–54.
172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). Opt out might scuttle the class action if the
class unravels as the sample average changes. Whether this will happen depends, among
other things, on the litigation cost savings with aggregation and sampling. In any event,
this is a factor to consider when deciding whether to sample, but it is not relevant to rightsbased objections.
173. For an excellent discussion of this point, see DWORKIN, supra note 166, at 93–94;
see also Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1013–18
(2010). According to Professor Dworkin, procedural rights should be understood as rights
to equal concern and respect in the distribution of the risk of outcome error. DWORKIN,
supra note 166, at 92–93. Dworkin’s analysis is too complicated to review in detail here. In
a nutshell, he argued that outcome errors produce “moral harm” as well as “bare harm.”
See id. at 80–81. Moral harm consists of the injustice associated with failing to honor
substantive legal rights, and thus is always produced by outcome error. While bare harm is
suitable for utilitarian balancing, moral harm is properly the subject of rights. Roughly,
each party has a procedural right to a distribution of error risk that reflects equal concern
and respect for the importance of the moral harm at stake. Id. at 92–93 (noting that each
party has “a right to procedures justified by the correct assignment of importance to the
moral harm the procedures risk, and a related right to a consistent evaluation of that harm
in the procedures afforded them as compared with the procedures afforded others in
different civil cases”). Thus, Dworkin focused mainly on the distribution of error risk and
saw procedural rights as constraining the set of acceptable distributions.
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differ from substantive entitlements cannot by itself be enough to
condemn the procedure. Obviously, all procedure generates outcome
error; no conceivable procedural system could possibly enforce the
substantive law perfectly. So if the mere possibility of error were
enough, then all procedures would have to be condemned. Moreover,
it also makes no sense to specify some maximum level of error risk for
all cases, because the acceptable level varies with the type of case.174
For these reasons, a rights-based theory focuses on the
distribution, rather than the absolute magnitude, of the error risk. It
insists that this distribution treat all right holders with equal concern
and respect. Whether a particular distribution satisfies this condition
depends on the reasons for the distribution. A procedure like
sampling can distribute error risk unevenly and still be justified
provided the reasons for using the procedure accord all claimants
equal concern and respect as individual right holders.175 Reducing
social costs is not a good enough reason because it does not respect
litigants as holders of procedural rights that trump or constrain
aggregate cost reduction. However, assuring fair and just treatment
for all litigants can be good enough.
For example, when mass tort cases are litigated individually,
plaintiffs who file late can experience serious delay if early filers clog
the courts.176 Delay is costly because it reduces the real value of any
174. More generally, it makes no sense to frame the procedural right as a right to a
specific level of error risk. See Bone, supra note 166, at 513–16. There is no natural way to
define the requisite level. The right cannot guarantee perfect accuracy because perfect
accuracy is impossible. Nor can it guarantee maximal accuracy because there is no limit to
maximal accuracy. We can always improve accuracy by trying a case multiple times and
using the most frequently occurring result or the average of the trial verdicts, but that
means that a right to maximal accuracy would commit society to spending all its resources
on procedure—a clearly absurd result. See id. at 514. Finally, formulating the right as a
right to a “reasonable” risk of error begs the question what is “reasonable,” and defining it
as a right to a “fair hearing” begs the question what is “fair.”
175. For example, plausibility pleading, applied strictly, can make it difficult for
plaintiffs to file suit when the defendant has exclusive possession of the information the
plaintiff needs to make the necessary allegations, and as a result it can systematically skew
error in the defendant’s favor. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 925–28 (2009). This does not necessarily
mean, however, that plausibility pleading violates procedural rights any more than notice
pleading does (by increasing the risk of in terrorem settlements). It all depends on the
reasons for the rule and the resulting error-risk distribution. See id. at 912–15 (describing a
rights-based analysis of pleading rules).
176. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 866–67 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting the extremely long delays in adjudicating asbestos cases due to the
huge number of filed lawsuits, and the resulting impact on plaintiffs). Also, in a limited
fund case, where the defendant does not have enough assets to satisfy all the plaintiffs’
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recovery. The order of filing, however, is often just a matter of luck,
contingent on when an injury happens to occur or become manifest,
and there is no moral reason why luck should make a difference to
what a plaintiff recovers. Aggregation reduces delay cost and evens
out its impact,177 and sampling makes aggregation possible. It is true
that plaintiffs with high-value claims receive less than their
substantive entitlements.178 But not everyone can recover fully. The
choice, therefore, is between giving full recovery to some and nothing
to others, or distributing the error risk in a way that treats each
person as an equal right holder. A rights-based theory opts for the
latter and justifies sampling as a means to that end.
In sum, it is important that a court justify the use of sampling in a
way that addresses systematic outcome effects. Sampling is relatively
easy to justify within an efficiency-based theory, but a rights-based
theory imposes tighter constraints. Still, no matter which theory one
adopts, sampling can always be justified when it makes possible the
litigation of small claims, when its litigation cost savings compensate
for any outcome shortfall, or when plaintiffs consent to its use. It can
also be justified when the aggregation it supports improves the
justness and fairness of the error risk distribution.
C.

Other Factors

There are additional factors that should be considered when
deciding whether to use sampling. I have discussed many of these in
my other writing,179 and I will only summarize them here.
First, by speeding up recovery and reducing litigation and delay
costs, sampling attracts more lawsuits, and the resulting increase in
litigation can produce excessive deterrence.180 This is especially
claims, those plaintiffs who file suit early obtain full recovery while those who file late,
after the defendant’s limited assets have been exhausted, receive nothing beyond a formal
judgment. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1774, at 30–32 (3d ed. 2005) (citing Norman C.
Sabbey, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 539, 541
(1969)). Aggregation through sampling helps redress this inequality by permitting an
equitable distribution that binds everyone. See id. § 1774, at 32.
177. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 632–33 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
178. A trial judge can, and in some cases should, reduce the divergence by using a
stratified sample or possibly even regression techniques.
179. See Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 239–59; Bone, Statistical
Adjudication, supra note 7, at 576–94.
180. Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 596.
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problematic when the aggregation made possible by sampling
increases liability exposure beyond what Congress envisioned when it
created the substantive claim.181 Judges should be aware of these risks
and possibly deny sampling when they are too serious. But the
possibility of overdeterrence in some cases should not bar sampling
across the board.
Second, sampling can reduce the amount plaintiffs are willing to
invest in litigation relative to the defendant, and the resulting
asymmetry can skew error risk in the defendant’s favor.182 However,
there are many factors that affect litigation investment incentives, and
it is not at all clear how significant this particular one is. In any event,
as I have explained elsewhere, the asymmetry can be reduced by
careful choice of the sampling protocol.183
Third, sampling can reduce incentives to settle by affecting the
size of the settlement surplus.184 This is not necessarily a serious
concern, however, because many factors affect settlement incentives.
Moreover, the problem with reduced settlement incentives is that it
produces more trials, and sampling might save enough in litigation
costs to compensate for any trial costs it adds.
Fourth, any evaluation of sampling must take account of its
impact on the filing of frivolous claims.185 Since sampling relieves
181. Although they do not involve sampling, class actions for statutory damages can
impose crippling liability beyond what Congress likely intended, especially in cases
involving minor, if any, actual harm. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d
13, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the risk that class certification could lead to a
potentially devastating damages award disproportionate to the harm actually suffered in a
case with twelve million individuals seeking statutory damages authorized by the Cable
Communications Policy Act).
182. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 7, at 589–90. For example, suppose a
court has an aggregation of 1,000 cases and tries a sample of 100. The defendant will invest
in the 100 sampled cases based on its expected liability over all 1,000 cases. If sample-case
plaintiffs receive the sample average, however, they will invest suboptimally because they
have incentives to free ride on other sample-case plaintiffs and are not able to capture all
the benefits they confer on the other plaintiffs in the aggregation. Thus, free riding and
externalities can lead plaintiffs to invest less in the sampled cases than the defendant,
which should increase the defendant’s chance of winning assuming that a party is more
likely to win the more she invests relative to her opponent.
183. Id. at 590–91. The asymmetry can be minimized in many cases by giving the
sample average to all the plaintiffs in the aggregation and spreading the litigation costs
evenly among them. See id. As it happens, these conditions were satisfied in the Tyson
Foods case, where the sample average was applied to all employees in the class and
sampling costs were borne proportionately by all class members. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043–44 (2016).
184. See Bone, Actuarial Litigation, supra note 7, at 244–47.
185. Id. at 250–51.
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litigants of the need to prove liability and damages on an
individualized basis, it creates incentives for lawyers to pack the class
or other aggregation with frivolous and weak claims. However, this
adverse selection problem inheres in all aggregations, whether or not
they use sampling. For example, class actions frequently end in
aggregate settlements based on average claim values, and this
averaging process creates incentives to include as many claims as
possible in the class, regardless of merit. Yet this risk is not thought
serious enough to reject the class action device outright. Indeed, the
class in Tyson Foods included some employees who had meritless
claims, but this did not stop the Court from allowing sampling. The
risk of frivolous filings should be an important factor in judicial
decisions whether to authorize sampling, just as it should be in
judicial decisions whether to certify a class or approve a class
settlement. But sampling should not be denied just because it
encourages the filing of some frivolous claims.
Fifth, depending on how it is structured, sampling can deny
participation opportunities to many plaintiffs.186 When everyone
receives the sample average, only those plaintiffs in the sampled cases
have a chance to litigate the issues.187 The significance of this fact,
however, depends on whether individual participation is valued for
outcome quality reasons or process-oriented dignitary reasons.188 If
outcome quality is the focus, there is no cause for concern as long as
the sample plaintiffs vigorously litigate their cases and the sample is
representative of the aggregation. When a case is vigorously litigated,
there is no reason to believe that a second case will produce a more
accurate result from a social perspective. The second plaintiff might
win when the first loses, but that does not mean that the result in the
second case is more accurate than the result in the first.
Dignity is a different matter. Many proceduralists believe that
personal participation and control are required to respect the dignity
of persons affected by litigation, entirely apart from any impact on

186. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra
note 7, at 617–50.
187. See id. at 618. The Court might allow non-sampled plaintiffs to intervene in the
sampled cases, but managing a large set of plaintiffs is likely to be very burdensome and
will end up diluting individual participation if the judge has to appoint a litigation steering
committee.
188. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253
(1985).
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outcome quality.189 Even the United States Supreme Court recognizes
a robust due process right to a personal “day in court” that is difficult
to justify except with a dignitary theory.190
A dignity-based participation right, however, is not an
insurmountable barrier to sampling. For one thing, the class action
already curtails participation opportunities, and this is considered
justifiable because the named plaintiffs represent the interests of
absent class members.191 By this same logic, it should be possible to
justify sampling as part of that representational relationship—the
named plaintiffs and class attorney choose sampling on behalf of the
class, just as they choose any other litigation strategy.
More generally, the participation right is best understood as a
flexible institutional right, not an absolute autonomy right.192 By
189. See, e.g., id. at 162–63; Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell,
Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation
Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1893–94 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275–77 (2004) (linking individual participation to
legitimacy); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and
Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 103–11 (2011) (exploring the non-outcome-based,
collectively-oriented benefits of aggregation and implications for procedure).
190. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson
Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)); Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 577, 585–86 (2011) (explaining why Taylor’s strong day-in-court right can be
supported only by a process-oriented participation theory).
191. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (recognizing the class action as an exception to the general
rule against nonparty preclusion).
192. Bone, supra note 190, at 614–16. It might be tempting to invoke the balancing test
of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to justify limits on the day-in-court
participation right and make room for sampling. See id. at 334–35; see also Hilao v. Estate
of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the Mathews test to address a
due process challenge to sampling). There are at least three problems with this strategy.
First, the Mathews test focuses mainly on the instrumental value of procedure in producing
accurate outcomes, whereas the day-in-court right focuses on procedure’s intrinsic value in
respecting individual dignity. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal
and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 202–03, 264–79 (1992) (arguing that the
Supreme Court’s broad right to a personal day in court, strictly applied, best fits a processoriented dignitary theory of participation). Second, insofar as the Mathews test is
utilitarian, it is incompatible with participation as a right. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 47–49
(1976) (arguing that the Mathews test is utilitarian). Third, and most importantly, the
Mathews test does not fit the Supreme Court’s day-in-court jurisprudence. The Court has
never invoked the Mathews balancing test to analyze due process challenges to nonparty
preclusion; instead it relies on a supposed “deep-rooted historical tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93. Moreover, the Court
recognizes an extremely broad day-in-court right that guarantees expansive individual
control over litigation choices, a degree of control that exceeds anything the Mathews test
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calling it an institutional right, I mean that the participation right is
defined by the balance of considerations relevant to assuring that
adjudication works fairly and justly for all litigants. The fact that the
participation right functions as a right necessarily means that it
excludes utilitarian reasons for limiting participation based on social
welfare maximization. But the fact that it functions as an institutional
right means that it tolerates limits that substantially further the
institutional goals of adjudication. These include limits that make
meaningful recovery possible for all claimants and even limits that
reduce litigation costs when those costs are so high that they interfere
with the effective functioning of the institution.193
Sixth, any use of sampling must take account of Rules Enabling
Act (“REA”) constraints. The REA authorizes the Supreme Court to
make rules of practice and procedure, including the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.194 The REA includes a proviso that no Rule can
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”195 The impact of
the REA proviso on the legitimacy of sampling is examined in Part
IV.196 Here it is useful to focus on a particular sampling constraint that
the Tyson Foods Court derives from the REA: sampling is
permissible in a class action only when it is also permissible in an
individual suit.197
This is an unfortunate interpretation of the REA. It forces a
judge contemplating the use of sampling in a class action to first
justify its use in individual suits. This might not be too difficult if the
same reasons apply to both class and individual litigation. But it
makes no sense to require the extra step when sampling is
appropriate precisely because cases are aggregated. The class action,
would support. See id. at 898–901. As I argue in the text, the participation right is limited,
but its limits do not derive from the Mathews balancing test. Rather, they derive from the
fact that participation is an institutional right subject to institutional constraints that still
respect its status as a right.
193. The right to jury trial must be considered as well. This is a complicated issue that I
will not explore here. Whether sampling creates a jury trial issue depends on the sampling
protocol. In particular, there is no problem if sampling is used to derive information about
averages that is then presented to a jury, as in Tyson Foods. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1043–44 (2016).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
195. Id. § 2072(b).
196. See infra Section IV.B.2.
197. See Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048 (distinguishing Wal-Mart by arguing that the
intra-class heterogeneity in Wal-Mart precluded use of sampling in individual suits and
that because of that, “[p]ermitting the use of that sample in a class action . . . would have
violated the Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a
class proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action”).
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for example, gathers all cases within a single court’s jurisdiction and
thus makes it easier to draw a random sample.198 Also, the most
compelling reasons to use sampling often focus on socially valuable
aggregations and on sampling’s contribution in facilitating them. If
the only sensible interpretation of the REA required the Tyson Foods
limitation, then we would have to accept it as a misguided constraint
imposed by Congress. But, as explained in Part IV, this limitation is
not the only sensible interpretation. When sampling is used to remove
obstacles to the efficient, fair, and just enforcement of substantive
rights, it serves the same purposes as any other procedural rule, and
there is no reason why the REA should bar it.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY PROBLEM
The analysis in Part III showed that sampling, when properly
designed, can be the best, and sometimes the only, way to enable
private enforcement of the substantive law and assure fair and just
outcomes for all injured parties. It also showed that concerns about
heterogeneity and day-in-court participation rights, while relevant, do
not prevent the use of sampling in many cases where it otherwise
makes sense. Even so, it is likely that many readers will still have
nagging doubts. For them, I suspect, a process of deciding cases by
statistically extrapolating from a random sample just does not seem
legitimate for adjudication. But it is not easy to explain why.199
The following discussion first distinguishes between perceived
legitimacy and normative legitimacy and argues that any convincing
critique of statistical adjudication must be cast in normative terms. It
then examines three normative arguments against the use of
sampling. The first is that sampling is such a radical departure from
ordinary adjudication that it risks jeopardizing the integrity of the
institution. The second is that sampling’s effects make it too
substantive to qualify as a legitimate procedural device suitable for
use without legislative approval. The third focuses on the way
198. If individual suits were litigated separately, all the judges involved in the various
lawsuits would have to know about the other pending cases, agree on the use of sampling,
and coordinate its implementation. In addition, if sample cases are tried and the average
(or other statistic) is used for all the rest, then the court might be required to have
personal jurisdiction over the sampled plaintiffs and possibly venue over their suits as well.
199. There are other situations where intuitions about legitimacy are strong but not
easy to justify. For example, I expect most people would think it illegitimate to conduct an
election for President of the United States by randomly sampling the electorate and basing
the outcome on the sample results—even if a reliable sampling procedure could be
designed and sampling was much less expensive than allowing everyone to vote.
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sampling alters the decision-making process: it substitutes a
mechanical algorithm for case-specific reasoning.
A. Normative Legitimacy Versus Perceived Legitimacy
There are two different types of legitimacy: perceived legitimacy
and normative legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy focuses on subjective
perceptions of legitimacy and worries that the public might lose faith
in the court system.200 Normative legitimacy focuses on whether the
procedure in question is legitimate on normative grounds,
independent of public perceptions.201
There are several problems with using perceived legitimacy to
critique statistical adjudication. First, it seems far-fetched to think
that the public will lose faith in the court system if sampling is used
selectively.202 In fact, the public might respond favorably if sampling
speeds recovery and helps to compensate deserving victims. Second,
public perceptions are circular. The more sampling is used, the more
familiar the public will become with it and the more legitimate it will
seem. Third, and most important, criticisms based on perceived
legitimacy are often normative legitimacy critiques in disguise. A
critic might believe that the particular practice is normatively
illegitimate, assume that everyone else must share the same belief,
and conclude that the public will reject the practice as illegitimate. By
framing a normative intuition as an empirical claim about public
perceptions, the critic never has to explain the theoretical basis for
her intuition. For these reasons, any legitimacy critique of statistical
adjudication should be framed in normative terms.
B.

Three Arguments from Normative Legitimacy

This Section critically examines three possible critiques based on
normative legitimacy: (1) that sampling is too strange a fit with
adjudication, (2) that it is too substantive to qualify as procedure, and
(3) that it is too mechanical to substitute for the ordinary judicial
reasoning process. Before proceeding, however, it is important to
address two other arguments that are often presented as legitimacy
critiques.

200. See Bone, supra note 192, at 233–35.
201. Id. at 236.
202. For example, I am not aware of any evidence of public opposition to the limited
use of bellwether trials and statistical adjudication today.
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The first argument simply treats the negative effect on
participation rights as a matter of institutional legitimacy, not just
individual dignity.203 This argument fares no better cast in legitimacy
terms than it does cast in dignity terms. All the same responses apply
with equal force.204
The second legitimacy argument invokes the dichotomy,
common in procedure literature, between two models of litigation:
the “traditional model” and the “public law model.”205 The traditional
model supposes that the primary function of civil adjudication is to
resolve private disputes.206 The public law model envisions the
purpose of adjudication more broadly, as involving regulation and
public-norm creation and enforcement.207 Relying on this dichotomy,
a critic might argue that sampling is not legitimate because it departs
too much from the traditional model.
This argument, however, goes absolutely nowhere. Civil
adjudication has never been merely about resolving private disputes.
Insofar as it resolves disputes, it does so according to the substantive
law.208 The purpose is to enforce substantive law rights, and the point
of doing that is to promote the values the substantive law embodies.
Thus, adjudication at its core is regulatory. Given this, a critic of
sampling must explain why it is not legitimate to use sampling to
improve substantive law enforcement. Put differently, the fact that
sampling diverges from the traditional model means nothing because

203. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135–37 (2009);
Solum, supra note 189, at 279–80.
204. See supra notes 186–93 and accompanying text.
205. Professor Abram Chayes, in his famous 1976 article, posited two models of
litigation: the traditional model and the public law model. See Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282–84 (1976). And others
have framed a similar dichotomy using different terminology. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen,
Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–7
(1985) (highlighting differences between the “arbitration model” and the “regulation
model”); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 121, 122–25 (1982) (parsing the “dispute resolution model” and the
“structural reform” model); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 937, 937–39 (1975) (distinguishing the “Conflict Resolution Model” and the
“Behavior Modification Model”).
206. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 205, at 1282–84.
207. See id. at 1282–84, 1302.
208. Indeed, this is why the system has motions to dismiss, broad discovery, extensive
pretrial and trial procedures, and other elaborate features aimed at preventing strategic
abuse and generating reasonably accurate outcomes.
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the traditional model is not an accurate depiction of our litigation
system.209
1. Sampling Is Too Strange
Statistical adjudication, at first glance, seems quite foreign to civil
adjudication, as it is customarily practiced. Courts do not decide cases
by averaging over a sample; they engage the facts of each case and
reason to the best decision based on those facts. Still, the oddity of
sampling is not a problem in itself. The merger of law and equity must
have seemed odd to mid-nineteenth century American judges and
lawyers accustomed to a dual system, and the adoption of liberal
pleading and broad discovery in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must have seemed strange to jurists at that time. Still, all
these innovations were eventually accepted as established features of
the litigation landscape.210
The way to make sense of this criticism is to treat it as an
argument based on a Burkean conservatism about institutions and the
risks of radical reform.211 There is some wisdom in proceeding
cautiously when altering an extremely complex institution like civil
adjudication, especially an institution that has evolved over centuries.
A reform that might seem sensible can produce unintended
consequences that change the institution in irreversible ways.
There are, however, two problems with this argument as a
critique of sampling. First, sampling—and statistical decision making
209. For a more thorough discussion of the problems with the traditional/public-law
dichotomy, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1275–76 (1995). In addition to these two concerns, some people might worry
that sampling introduces too much mathematics or smacks too much of law-andeconomics. But neither of these is a serious objection. In fact, the tools of mathematics and
law-and-economics have much to offer procedure. Some people might worry that sampling
will dehumanize the litigation process over the long run, but this is an unrealistic fear if
judges use sampling selectively and only when it is well justified.
210. Pleading standards and broad discovery are targets of criticism, of course, but few
argue that they are illegitimate.
211. One might frame this argument in terms of tradition, but then one must explain
why tradition should be the touchstone of legitimacy. Indeed, if legitimacy required
following traditional practices, much of contemporary civil procedure would have to be
jettisoned, since much of it represents a major departure from traditional practices. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 24 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (describing the way
that the 1966 reforms of Rules 19 and 24 departed from previous practice); Robert G.
Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from
the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 104–07 (1989) (describing how
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered traditional joinder rules).
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more generally—are not all that strange to civil adjudication. In fact,
as explained below, they are already well-entrenched features of
adjudication, just not in obvious ways. Second, sampling is too
sensible a tool to block its use on this ground. More generally,
Burkean conservatism should not paralyze sensible reforms,
especially reforms that target rapidly changing conditions.
a.

Sampling Is Not That Strange After All

Sampling and decision making based on statistical averaging are
not that strange in adjudication. When a lawmaker fashions a general
rule of substantive law, she designs the rule with an eye to what is
typical or average for the type of scenario she is trying to regulate.212
Moreover, to determine what is typical, the lawmaker focuses on
what she knows, which is necessarily a subset or sample of all the
possible scenarios—past, present, and future. It follows that when the
rule is applied to a particular case, the resulting decision is based
indirectly on the lawmaker’s sample.
Consider a simple example. Suppose lawmakers adopt a law that
prohibits drivers from exceeding fifty miles per hour on a stretch of
highway. This law is based, among other things, on predictions and
statistics about the risk of accidents at different speeds. Those
predictions, in turn, must average over a sample of driving
experience. It follows that when a judge finds a defendant liable for
driving sixty miles per hour, the judge engages in a kind of statistical
adjudication. Driving sixty miles per hour might have been perfectly
safe given the weather, traffic, and road conditions that the defendant
faced at the time. But the defendant’s liability depends not on his own
driving conditions, but instead on the average case that the rule was
designed to target, which itself is based on a sample of driving
experience. To be sure, whether the defendant exceeded fifty miles
per hour is a case-specific determination, but whether the defendant’s
speed was unsafe is not. This is, after all, how general rules work.
Settlements also rely on sampling.213 Parties value their cases for
settlement purposes based on results in similar cases. In particular,
each side estimates the likelihood of trial success, the probable trial
212. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the difference between rules and standards).
213. This is particularly significant because only about two percent of filed civil cases
are ever tried; most settle and the rest are dismissed or dropped. See Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459, 462–63 tbl.1 (2004).
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award, and the costs of litigating by averaging over a sample of
previous cases.214 Thus, if the case settles, the plaintiff receives an
average recovery based on the sample, which is the same as she would
receive through statistical adjudication.215
Finally, jury verdicts are also based on assumptions about
average behavior derived from experience. This is true no matter
what view of jury decision-making one holds.216 In Bayesian theory,
jurors use conditional probabilities to update their prior beliefs that a
particular hypothesis is true (such as that the defendant was drunk
while driving).217 Conditional probabilities are based on average
expectations over a juror’s slice of real world experience.218 If jurors

214. See BONE, supra note 131, at 71–78 (describing the standard model of settlement).
Suppose that defendant’s lawyer is aware of 100 similar cases that were tried previously.
Suppose that 40 of these cases ended in plaintiff victories and 60 ended in defendant
victories. Also, of the 40 plaintiff victories, 10 cases ended in trial verdicts of $200,000, 20
cases in verdicts of $150,000, and 10 cases in verdicts of $100,000. Finally, in 50 of the 100
cases, it cost defendants $25,000 to litigate the case through trial, and in the other 50, it
cost only $15,000. Defendant’s lawyer should estimate a 40% chance of plaintiff
winning at trial, which is the average of total past wins and losses: 40
wins ÷ 100 cases = 40%. She should also estimate an expected trial verdict of $150,000,
which is the average of all the verdict amounts in the 40 cases that plaintiffs won:
[(10 × 200,000) + (20 × 150,000) + (10 × 100,000)] ÷ 40 = 6,000,000 ÷ 40 = $150,000. And she
should estimate expected litigation costs of $20,000, the average of the litigation
costs over the 100 cases: [(50 × 25,000) + (50 × 15,000)] ÷ 100 = $20,000. Thus, defendant’s
lawyer will calculate an expected trial loss of (0.4 × 150,000) + 20,000 = $80,000. As a result, a
risk-neutral defendant should be willing to pay up to $80,000 to settle the case. The
important point to note here is that all these estimates are averages over a sample of 100
cases.
215. Indeed, random sampling through statistical adjudication can produce a more
accurate average value for claims than informal settlements distorted by informational
asymmetries. One might wonder about the propriety of comparing sampling for trial with
settlement, but it is a perfectly sensible comparison. Settlements are outcomes of the
litigation process just as much as trial judgments are. As such, settlements must be
evaluated by the same substantive law metric that applies to trial judgments. It is true that
settlements are supported by consent, but parties can also consent to statistical
adjudication. To be sure, consent to statistical adjudication usually comes from the
attorney and is susceptible to agency problems, but agency problems also infect
settlements. Because unsophisticated clients depend on their attorneys for advice, an
attorney can nudge the client towards a settlement that serves the attorney’s interests
more than the client’s. In addition, consent to a settlement is normatively problematic
when the litigation alternative is infected by high delay or transaction costs. My point is
only that consent does not mark a clear distinction between settlements and sampling.
216. See generally Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66
VAND. L. REV. 547 (2013) (describing two alternative conceptions of evidence and
proof—probabilistic versus explanatory).
217. For a brief description of Bayesian theory, see id. at 575 n.112.
218. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of
Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 108 (2007). More precisely,
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instead engage in a more holistic process of “inference to the best
explanation,” each juror will assess the “relative plausibility of the
competing hypotheses advanced by the parties”219 by comparing these
hypotheses to her own “stories, scripts, and scenarios.”220 Those
stores, scripts, and scenarios are composites of a juror’s experience,
which is just an informal sample of reality. Moreover, the most salient
stories, scripts, and scenarios are likely to homogenize or average
over that informal sample.221

jurors are assumed to rely on a likelihood ratio, which is the ratio of the probability of
discovering and receiving particular evidence if the hypothesis is true divided by the
probability of discovering and receiving the same evidence if some other hypothesis is
true. See Pardo, supra note 216, at 575 n.112. In these models of evidentiary inference, the
likelihood ratio measures the probative value of the evidence. See Allen & Pardo, supra,
at 108. Bayes’s Theorem gives a way to update one’s assessment of the probability a
hypothesis is true by combining one’s prior probability with the likelihood ratio for a
particular piece of evidence.
219. Allen & Pardo, supra note 218, at 136.
220. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 604, 629 (1994); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best
Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 234–35 (2008). Professor Allen describes the process
this way:
[W]e carry around stories, scripts, and scenarios, all more or less robust and all
subject to modification in a virtually infinite variety of ways. “Evidence” in the
human brain is embedded in these contexts, although fluidly in a way that permits
constant cycling back and forth between the data, new and old, and their stories. It
is into this bubbling cauldron that the trial “evidence” must enter, and its effect is
determined by the interaction of the data with the prior knowledge stored in the
related chunks constituting stories. Trial observations instantiate these stories and
work modifications of them. This, of course, merely reemphasizes the dynamic
nature of evidence and highlights that the data at trial that the conventional theory
refers to as evidence is merely the means by which the preexisting stories and
scenarios of factfinders are put into play, as it were, in order to fashion an estimate
of what actually happened. . . . The structure of proof requires selection over the
stories advanced at trial, and for data to be coherent it must be embedded, or be
able to be embedded, in stories highly analogous if not identical to the stories
being advanced by the parties as their claims about what happened.
Allen, supra, at 629–30. It is worth mentioning that inference to the best explanation is not
logically inconsistent with Bayesian updating, but the type of Bayesian updating that
would be required is far too complex to make it feasible. Id. at 607.
221. Of course, not all evidence is equally vulnerable to this averaging process. Direct
evidence, for example, can provide very strong support for the ultimate fact. But even
direct evidence must be evaluated for credibility and reliability, which involves a juror’s
experience and her stories, scripts, and scenarios. In the Tyson Foods case, for example, a
video showing donning and doffing by a specific employee or an average for that
employee over multiple donning and doffing activities would be extremely strong evidence
of donning and doffing times for that employee. Yet jurors must still assess the evidence in
light of the possibility that the data is defective or the sampling methodology flawed, and
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Thus, while we tend to think of adjudication as providing an
individualized outcome for each particular case, adjudicative
outcomes, to a large extent, average over samples of similar cases.
This means that we should revisit our initial reaction to sampling. To
be sure, it is unusual for a judge to decide a case by relying directly on
a statistic derived from a sample. But it is not clear that it is
sufficiently unusual to justify rejecting the procedure outright.
b.

The Value of Sensible Reform

The litigation system as we know it today took shape through
active reform efforts that responded to changing economic, social,
political, and intellectual conditions.222 The same is true for statistical
adjudication. It too responds to changing conditions—in this case, the
creation of new causes of action, the advent of mass harms,
improvements in technology, and so on. Reforms like these are
particularly useful when change is too rapid for the gradual process of
institutional evolution to respond effectively.
Still, it is important to guard against overconfidence and
excessive reform zeal. There are risks to altering any complex system,
and one must account for the risks in advance whenever possible.
Moreover, institutions have core elements that are essential to their
proper functioning, and one must be careful not to jeopardize those
elements. Below I argue that one such element for civil adjudication,
perhaps the most important, is the reasoning process judges use to
decide cases. But I also argue that statistical adjudication does not
endanger that process as long as it is used properly. In the end,
sampling is too sensible and useful a tool in the current world of
litigation for a Burkean concern to prevent its use.
2. Sampling Is Too Substantive
One might worry that sampling should be implemented as
substantive law, not as procedure, because of its outcome effects. The
concern is the same as the one discussed above: sampling
systematically and predictably skews individual recoveries away from
substantive entitlements. This aspect raises potential problems under
the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”), with its proviso that court-made

to do that, each juror must apply his or her experience—stories, scripts, and scenarios—to
assess competing expert testimony.
222. See Bone, supra note 211, at 9–12, 78–80 (discussing the reform efforts that led to
the field code and those that led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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rules must not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”223
and also implicates separation-of-powers concerns more generally.
The argument is that if sampling alters substantive rights by skewing
outcomes, it can be used legitimately only when it is authorized by
substantive rules made in the usual way substantive law is made.224
This is the concern that animated the Wal-Mart Court’s rejection
of statistical adjudication for backpay awards.225 While a bit opaque,
the Court’s argument is fairly easy to understand. Because the Ninth
Circuit’s proposed sampling procedure would have afforded relief to
some class members who had no right to it (because Wal-Mart had a
good defense that it was not allowed to litigate), that procedure
“enlarged” the substantive rights of those class members in violation
of the REA.226 The problem is that this reading of the REA threatens
all forms of statistical adjudication. At its core, statistical adjudication
depends on sampling, and sampling works by cutting off the
individual litigation of rights and defenses for cases that are not part
of the sample. To be sure, the REA applies only to those procedural
rules, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted pursuant to
the formal court rulemaking process.227 But separation-of-powers
principles extend more broadly and create similar issues for sampling
implemented through judge-made common law.
Fortunately for the future of statistical adjudication, Wal-Mart’s
interpretation of the REA is not the Court’s last word on the subject.
Tyson Foods reads Wal-Mart narrowly to create some room for
sampling.228 According to the Tyson Foods Court, sampling is
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012); see supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1023 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J.,
concurring) (observing that “there is a fine line between deriving results from trials based
on statistical sampling and pure legislation” and that the court is “not authorized by the
Constitution or statutes to legislate solutions to cases in pursuit of efficiency and
expeditiousness”); cf. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (“We are
told . . . that the difficulties faced by the courts as well as the rights of the class members to
have their cases tried cry powerfully for innovation and judicial creativity. The arguments
are compelling, but they are better addressed to the representative branches—Congress
and the State Legislature.”).
225. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
226. See id. Although the Court referred to the defendant’s “right to litigate” defenses,
it seems unlikely that the Court meant to focus on the process of litigating. It is much more
likely that the Court meant to focus on the outcome of litigating when the defendant is
unable to present its defenses.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
228. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016). The Tyson
Foods Court’s reading of Wal-Mart is highly questionable. It supposes that the Wal-Mart
Court used the likely result in an individual suit as the REA baseline. See id. However, a

95 N.C. L. REV. 607 (2017)

2017]

STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION

663

permitted in a class action if—and only if—it is also permitted in
individual suits.229 As discussed above, this limitation is undesirable as
a policy matter because it excludes cases where sampling makes sense
only in an aggregation.230 Moreover, the limitation is not compelled
by the REA, and it does not even fit the best interpretation of that
statute.231 The best interpretation of the REA proviso, as well as
separation-of-powers limitations, should permit a properly designed
sampling procedure when it is needed to enforce the substantive law
properly. When this is so, sampling serves procedural goals: it assures

better interpretation of Wal-Mart is that the Court compared the skewed outcomes from
sampling directly to the parties’ substantive law rights. On this interpretation, sampling
might well offend the REA or separation-of-powers principles even if it were used in
individual suits, again because it systematically skews outcomes away from substantive
entitlements.
229. Id. at 1046 (holding that the permissibility of sampling in an individual suit is both
necessary and sufficient for its use in a class action).
230. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. In fact, the Court’s argument begs the
central question: why sampling does not violate the REA or separation-of-powers
principles when it is used in an individual suit? Neither Tyson Foods nor Mt. Clemens
addresses this question. I argue in the text that sampling does not violate the REA or
offend separation-of-powers principles, and the reason applies equally to class actions and
individual suits.
231. The Supreme Court has never articulated a coherent doctrinal framework for
applying the REA proviso. Early on, the Court adopted a test that asked whether the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (relying on the
same test). The Court, however, did not explain how “really” regulating procedure differs
from just regulating it. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. In 2010, a plurality of the Court
endorsed a version of this test focusing on whether the rule on its face regulates a matter
of procedure, regardless of its substantive effects. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406–10 (2010) (plurality opinion) (upholding the validity
of Rule 23 against a challenge that it enlarged the substantive rights created by state law
and embodied in the state claim). And in 1987, the Court made clear that “incidental”
substantive effects would not invalidate a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, especially if the
rule was “reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of [the] system of rules[,]” and
also recognized a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure based on the careful review that those rules receive during the rulemaking
process. Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5, 8 (1987). One might argue that
Rule 23 with sampling really regulates procedure because it has a procedural purpose and
that its substantive effects are merely incidental. However, one might also argue that
sampling converts Rule 23 into more than a joinder device by injecting a substantive
dimension and that its substantive effects are more than incidental. It is difficult to resolve
this controversy without a clearer understanding of when a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure actually regulates procedure on its face and what constitutes an incidental
effect.
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that individuals with meritorious claims can obtain a fair and just
determination of their claims.232
It is true that sampling affects outcomes in predictable and
systematic ways, but so do many other procedures. For example,
tightening a pleading standard predictably and systematically
increases the error risk for plaintiffs with meritorious suits and
reduces the error risk for defendants.233 And relaxing the pleading
standard, as notice pleading does, has predictable and systematic
effects in the opposite direction. It follows that outcome effects, even
predictable and systematic effects, alone cannot be enough to trigger
the REA or separation-of-powers concerns. As long as sampling
serves procedural goals—such as distributing the risk of error more
fairly and efficiently or reducing process costs—and as long as there is
no legislative bar to its use,234 its substantive effects are merely
“incidental” and sampling does not intrude on the legislative
sphere.235
232. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1118–
21 (2012); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking,
Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 950–54 (1999)
(proposing a test to measure validity based on the rule’s justification); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1046–47
(2013) (arguing that the Wal-Mart Court should have considered the question whether
sampling was justified as an exercise of federal common law power to provide remedies
adequate to further Title VII policies).
233. See Bone, supra note 175, at 925–28.
234. If the best interpretation of the federal statute creating the substantive claim
clearly required case-specific determinations incompatible with the use of sampling, then
sampling would alter substantive rights and violate the REA and separation-of-powers
principles.
235. See Burlington N.R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 5 (holding that “incidental” effects on
substantive rights do not trigger the REA proviso). My discussion ignores potential
Article III concerns. The Tyson Foods Court did not decide whether Article III’s case or
controversy requirement prevents a class action from being certified when it includes class
members with no legal injury or when those class members cannot be identified and
excluded from sharing in the class recovery. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.
Ct. 1036, 1049–50 (2016); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016)
(holding that the named representative of a class seeking statutory damages must allege
concrete injury for Article III standing but stating nothing about whether absent class
members must also satisfy standing requirements). This Article III issue is not strictly
about sampling; it is about the permissibility of aggregations that include uninjured
individuals who would have no Article III standing to bring individual suits. Compare
Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that only
the named representative needs Article III standing), with Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG,
443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Article III applies to all class members). In
any case, if Article III bars certification of class actions that predictably include uninjured
class members, then it also bars sampling whether it is used in a class action or an
individual suit.
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One might argue that sampling is too substantive for a different
reason, namely, that it is likely to be politically controversial and
therefore should be vetted through the political process.236 But this
objection goes too far. Taken seriously, it would cripple the court
rulemaking process. For example, Rule 23 would violate the REA
proviso viewed in this way, as would the Federal Rules dealing with
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment, all of which attract
intense political controversy these days. The result—that virtually all
procedural law in federal court would have to be adopted by
Congress—is not only undesirable as a policy matter, but is also
plainly inconsistent with the congressional decision in the REA to
delegate the bulk of procedural rulemaking to the Supreme Court.237
3. Sampling Is Too Mechanical
Statistical adjudication substitutes a mechanical and formulaic
decision-making protocol for case-specific reasoning. The judge
calculates the average (or other statistic) based on the sample results
and applies it to all other cases in the aggregation. It is true that the
judge employs a reasoning process when she decides whether to
sample. Also, the sampled cases are decided in the usual way, by
applying reason to the facts in light of the relevant law. But the rest of
the aggregation is adjudicated mechanically without applying reason
to the facts of each case.
I believe this observation captures something important about
adjudication, but we need to be clear about what exactly that is. To
unpack the intuition, consider a hypothetical in which a judge flips a
coin to decide an issue. Suppose that the issue is committed entirely
to the judge’s discretion, such as the length of a sentence in a criminal
case within the bounds of sentencing guidelines. After hearing
extensive discussion, the judge comes to the conclusion that neither
side has a more compelling argument. As a result, she proposes to flip
a coin. Even if all the parties agree and there are no substantial third
party effects, I believe that many, perhaps most, people would

236. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (noting that a rule does not “abridge, enlarge, or modify”
substantive rights if it is so general that it does not evoke political controversy).
237. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1106–12 (1982) (arguing that the principal purpose of the REA proviso was to
allocate power between Congress and the Court).
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condemn the judge for deciding the issue in this way.238 When pressed
for an explanation, critics are likely to argue that flipping a coin is not
a legitimate way for a judge to decide, that judges are supposed to
employ reason and not rely on chance.
Notice that the problem is not arbitrariness: the judge in our
hypothetical has a sound justification for using a coin flip.239 From an
outcome perspective, the coin flip gives each side an equal chance,
which is about as much as parties can expect when a case is in
equipoise and there is no burden assignment rule to break ties.
Moreover, flipping a coin has the advantage of purging the decision of
any possible bias.
The reason that the coin flip is unacceptable, I believe, is not that
it produces an arbitrary result, but rather that it displaces the usual
case-specific reasoning process at the point of decision.240 One of
adjudication’s core elements, perhaps its most important, is its
commitment to reasoning from general principle in a way that
engages the facts of particular cases.241 More specifically, judges
interpret the law as they apply it by placing existing legal norms
alongside the facts of a case. This is a fancy way of describing
something very familiar to lawyers: common law reasoning. In the
common law system, even clear and seemingly categorical rules are
linked to and conditioned on general principles and the facts of
238. See, e.g., LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that he would refuse to enforce an arbitration clause
that “provided that the district judge would review the [arbitration award] by flipping a
coin”) overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003); In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 734, 736 (Mich. 2003) (accepting the
recommendation that a judge be censured for flipping a coin when neither side’s argument
was more persuasive); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 28–29, 28 nn.105–06 (2009) (providing several examples of judges being
sanctioned for flipping a coin to decide a case).
239. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO.
483, 495–505 (1988) (discussing equal entitlement and scarcity conditions for using the
lottery as an exclusive or nonexclusive method of allocation and noting that using the
lottery under these conditions is supported by reason).
240. See Shay Lavie, Note, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1084–85 (2011)
(“The public has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue
and . . . render reasoned rulings and decisions.” (quoting N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 88)); see also JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC
JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 38 (1989) (emphasizing
that “the use of lotteries to resolve decision problems under uncertainty presupposes an
unusual willingness to admit the insufficiency of reason”).
241. Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1387–91 (2012) (defending this point).
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previous cases in a way that gives them a more or less flexible
quality.242 A judge must decide how strictly to apply an established
rule to a particular case—whether to modify the rule or carve out
exceptions—by considering predictability, consistency, and other
rule-of-law values.243 The same is true for constitutional law, which
develops in a way rather similar to the common law process. And
even statutory rules require interpretation to determine whether they
apply to the case at hand and what they require on the particular
facts.
One way to describe this process is in terms of reflective
equilibrium.244 The judge moves back and forth between her best
understanding of the law including the principles and policies that
support it, and the moral and practical intuitions generated by
engaging the facts of the case, all the while adjusting law and intuition
until they fit together in a reflective equilibrium.245 My claim then is
that this reasoning process is a core, perhaps the core, feature of
adjudication. It is essential to the integrity of the institution, and it is
what distinguishes adjudication from arbitration, legislation, and
other modes of dispute resolution and lawmaking.
This claim is not essentialist; it does not assume a natural law
ideal for adjudication. It focuses on civil adjudication as that process
is actually practiced in the United States. All it assumes is that the
institution has evolved to perform certain functions, such as deciding
claims of right, regulating society, and making common law, and that
it developed features along the way to help it serve those functions
well. Thus, the claim is about our system of civil adjudication properly

242. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 71–80,
110–23, 340–41 (1978); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 372–81 (1978).
243. Scholars disagree about these matters. Compare DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra
note 242, at 264–66 (noting that judges should sometimes apply rules strictly but always
subject to the demands of principled integrity), with FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE 196–206 (1991) (arguing for a strong presumption in favor of strict
application).
244. On the method of reflective equilibrium, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 42–45 (rev. ed. 1999).
245. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 242, at 225–27 (describing a process of
legal reasoning grounded in an effort to form “the best constructive interpretation of the
community’s legal practice”); RAWLS, supra note 244, at 17–19 (describing the process of
seeking a reflective equilibrium).
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understood. More precisely, it is about the best normative
understanding of that institution.
Indeed, it is quite common to view adjudication as linked to a
special type of reasoning process that combines general principles
with case-specific facts.246 If this reasoning process is essential to what
adjudication does—and I believe it is—then we should worry when a
procedure threatens a court’s ability to engage in the process
effectively. Deciding a case by flipping a coin falls into this category,
as does choosing to have a judge decide a case by reading the entrails
of a chicken or empaneling a jury of twelve orangutans.247 These
methods of decision would be rejected as illegitimate despite the
parties’ agreement, not just because they are bizarre but because they
rob the judge of the ability to apply reason to the legally relevant
facts.
Although the question of legitimacy is more difficult for
sampling, there are some easy cases. The use of sampling to
determine facts does not interfere with the reflective equilibrium
process in any significant way. Tyson Foods is a good example. In that
case, sampling was used to determine how long employees took to
don and doff their protective equipment. This is as close to a pure fact
as one can get. To be sure, facts are inputs into the reasoning process,
but innovative methods for finding facts do not trump or distort that
process; they just affect the result. Moreover, the relevant FLSA law
in Tyson Foods was clear and the method of determining liability
fairly mechanical—add donning and doffing time to gang-time and
subtract K-code time.248 So, there was not much cause to insist on
case-specific reflective-equilibrium reasoning.
246. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 242, at 225–27, 245–47, 254–58;
Fuller, supra note 242, at 364, 366 (noting that “[a]djudication is . . . a device which gives
formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human
affairs” and that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it
confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation . . . that of presenting proofs
and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor”).
247. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that he would refuse to enforce an arbitration clause
that “provided that the district judge would review the [arbitration award] by . . . studying
the entrails of a dead fowl”) overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir.
1985) (noting that an agreement to trial by twelve orangutans would be invalid).
248. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. Moreover, in a jury trial case,
factual determinations are for the jury to decide and we do not expect jurors to engage in
a process of reflective equilibrium. To be sure, some jury questions, such as whether the
defendant was negligent, involve the application of law to fact, but we assume that the
judge first decides the applicable law and then instructs the jury what law to apply. I
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Beyond the easy cases, the legitimacy analysis gets murkier. But
there are some reasonably clear points. First, it is not necessary that
every individual case be decided by a process of reflective
equilibrium. If it were, the class action would not be legitimate. Nor
would it be legitimate to decide a common question of law and fact
separate from the specific facts of individual cases that give it texture
and context.
Second, mixed questions of law and fact can be appropriate for
sampling. For example, courts are comfortable using approximation
methods, including sampling, to estimate damages even though the
estimation process can involve the application of law to fact.249 After
the Wal-Mart decision, for example, some courts continued to use
sampling to calculate damages, distinguishing Wal-Mart as a case
involving sampling for liability.250
These two points go a long way to support the legitimacy of
sampling for liability as well as for damages. Sampling preserves the
reflective-equilibrium reasoning process for the sampled cases, which
is significant because not all cases need be decided in the
conventional way. Moreover, the fact that the liability issues involve
ignore the judge-jury distinction in the text and assume that the judge is deciding the issue
that is subject to sampling.
249. It is well settled, especially when the plaintiff faces evidentiary or other practical
obstacles to proof, that she need not provide a precise measure of damages; it is enough if
the plaintiff proposes a method that permits a “ ‘just and reasonable inference’ . . . even
though the result is only an approximation.” Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods
Int’l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 173 (App. Div. 1986) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)); see Pulaski & Middleman, LLC
v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In calculating damages, here
restitution, California law ‘requires only that some reasonable basis of computation of
damages be used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an
approximation.’ ” (quoting Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co., 185 F.3d 932, 938–39 (9th Cir.
1999)), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2410 (2016) (mem.); Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582
F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[w]hile the amount of lost profits ‘may not
be based on mere speculation, conjecture and surmise alone, the mere uncertainty as to
the exact amount of damages will not preclude the right of recovery. It is sufficient if the
evidence shows the extent of damage by just and reasonable inference.’ ” (quoting
Florafax Int’l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., Inc., 933 P.2d 282, 296 (Okla. 1997))). And as Tyson
Foods confirms, statistical sampling can be part of any such method. Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15d (2012) (allowing
damages to “be proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling methods”
in a parens patriae price-fixing case once the defendant has been found liable for a pricefixing agreement).
250. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2014)
(distinguishing Wal-Mart on the ground that the sampling in that case would have decided
liability issues and noting that “Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on the use
of extrapolation to calculate damages”).
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the application of law to fact is not in itself disqualifying. Judges
decide common questions independent of case-specific facts today,
and sampling is used to determine damages even when the inquiry
involves law applied to fact.
There is a third important point. Legitimacy cannot be just a
function of the decision-making method. Outcome quality matters,
too. In the extreme coin flip, chicken entrails, and orangutan
examples above, the adverse effect on adjudicative reasoning was
clear, direct, and serious, and there was no particular reason to use
the procedure other than to satisfy party preferences. By contrast,
sampling preserves the reasoning process in the sampled cases and
furthers the purposes of adjudication by improving efficiency and
making outcomes more fair and just for all parties.
These considerations also impose significant limits on the use of
sampling. Judges cannot just aggregate any set of related cases and
decide them all by sampling a few. Not only must the aggregation be
sufficiently homogeneous, but there must be a sound justification for
sampling from it, a justification that meets rights-based as well as
utilitarian constraints. And the sampling procedure must not sacrifice
the usual process of adjudicative reasoning for too many cases.251
Finally, while it is not essential for legitimacy, it might be wise,
insofar as possible, to have sampled cases decided by different courts.
Doing so has the advantage of harvesting a range of views on the
issues being decided.252 In addition, the decisions in each sampled case
should have precedential force in future cases to the extent decisions
ordinarily do. These measures would ensure that the sampled cases
are treated not just as samples for extrapolation purposes, but also as
ordinary cases contributing to the adjudicative process in the usual
way.

251. For example, suppose that judges in some state choose to routinely decide
negligence cases by sampling. These judges wait until enough automobile accident,
medical malpractice, or other negligence cases are filed and then sample from all the filed
cases, giving the rest the average of the sample verdicts. There are many different reasons
to object to this procedure, including concerns about population heterogeneity, the
magnitude of social benefits, the treatment of rights, and legitimacy. And from a
legitimacy perspective, it is significant that deciding cases in this way jettisons case-specific
reasoning in a huge swath of cases without any special justification for doing so.
252. The district court conducting the sampling would have to have authority to
transfer sampled cases to other courts, which might require legislation similar to the
Multidistrict Litigation Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
There is reason to celebrate the Tyson Foods decision and to
read it broadly. Statistical adjudication through sampling can be a
very useful procedural tool. Like summary judgment, case
management, and other procedures, it helps assure that adjudication
accomplishes its goals in the best possible way. Sampling must be
used properly, and this Article develops a set of factors to guide
decisions about whether and how to use it. These factors take account
of what the Tyson Foods Court says and what it does in light of the
broader purposes of civil adjudication.
Still, many are likely to balk at the idea that courts can decide
cases by extrapolating from a sample. Even the Tyson Foods Court
refuses to acknowledge that the case is one of statistical adjudication,
choosing instead to pretend that it is merely a case of statistical
evidence. I argued that these reservations have to do with nagging
doubts about the legitimacy of the procedure. I then examined three
legitimacy objections: that statistical adjudication is too strange, that
it is too substantive, and that it is too mechanical. None of these
objections is decisive. When used properly, statistical adjudication
through sampling neither transgresses the legitimate bounds of civil
adjudication, nor violates the substantive or procedural rights of
parties. It is past time that we embrace statistical adjudication without
skepticism or hostility. Tyson Foods opens the door. It is up to us to
seize the opportunity.
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